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Abstract 
In the last few decades, franchising has become a part of everyday life in the 
United States. Many firms in a variety of industries have adopted franchising as a method 
of doing business. Despite the importance of franchising, the literature on why firms 
initially choose to franchise and how franchising affects financial performance has been 
scant (Combs et al., 2004; Watson et al., 2005). The purposes of this study were 1) to 
examine how well agency theory, resource scarcity theory, risk-sharing theory, and 
specific knowledge theory justify the franchising decision, 2) to investigate whether 
franchising affects restaurant firms’ market value and profitability, and 3) to investigate 
the relationship between the ownership mix, combination of franchised and company-
owned outlets, and financial performance.   
For the statistical analysis, the data were collected from the Standard and Poor’s 
COMPUSTAT database, Bond’s Franchise Guide and 10 K reports. A logistic regression 
model was developed to identify a set of variables that best differentiated firms engaged 
in franchise contracts from those that were not. The statistical results indicated that: 1) 
Young and growing firms used franchise more to increase the flow of resources. This 
result supported resource scarcity theory.  2) The degree of geographic dispersion and 
involvement in foreign countries increased the probability of a firm’s decision to 
franchise. These results supported agency theory. 3) The decrease of specific knowledge 
requirements increased the franchising probability. This result supported specific 
knowledge theory. 
T-tests and multivariate regression models were used to test how franchising 
affects firms’ financial performance. The findings indicated that 1) franchised firms had 
   
better financial performance than non-franchised firms, 2) the relationship between 
ownership mix and financial performance was curvilinear and the inverted U-shaped 
relationship suggested the existence of optimal ownership mix that can maximize a firm’s 
financial performance, and 3) ownership mix not only directly affected a firm’s 
intangible assets, but also indirectly affected a firm’s intangible assets through 
advertising. This study found that a purely company owned or a purely franchised chain 
did not produce the best financial performance. Restaurant companies could use both 
company-owned and franchised units to leverage the strengths of one another, which will 
yield a better overall financial performance than if either structure was to operate alone.
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 Abstract  
In the last few decades, franchising has become a part of everyday life in the 
United States. Many firms in a variety of industries have adopted franchising as a method 
of doing business. Despite the importance of franchising, the literature on why firms 
initially choose to franchise and how franchising affects financial performance has been 
scant (Combs et al., 2004; Watson et al., 2005). The purposes of this study were 1) to 
examine how well agency theory, resource scarcity theory, risk-sharing theory, and 
specific knowledge theory justify the franchising decision, 2) to investigate whether 
franchising affects restaurant firms’ market value and profitability, and 3) to investigate 
the relationship between the ownership mix, combination of franchised and company-
owned outlets, and financial performance.   
For the statistical analysis, the data were collected from the Standard and Poor’s 
COMPUSTAT database, Bond’s Franchise Guide and 10 K reports. A logistic regression 
model was developed to identify a set of variables that best differentiated firms engaged 
in franchise contracts from those that were not. The statistical results indicated that: 1) 
Young and growing firms used franchise more to increase the flow of resources. This 
result supported resource scarcity theory.  2) The degree of geographic dispersion and 
involvement in foreign countries increased the probability of a firm’s decision to 
franchise. These results supported agency theory. 3) The decrease of specific knowledge 
requirements increased the franchising probability. This result supported specific 
knowledge theory. 
   
Paired sample t-tests and multivariate regression models were used to test how 
franchising affects firms’ financial performance. The findings indicated that 1) franchised 
firms had better financial performance than non-franchised firms, 2) the relationship 
between ownership mix and financial performance was curvilinear and the inverted U-
shaped relationship suggested the existence of optimal ownership mix that can maximize 
a firm’s financial performance, and 3) ownership mix not only directly affected a firm’s 
intangible assets, but also indirectly affected a firm’s intangible assets through 
advertising. This study found that a purely company owned or a purely franchised chain 
did not produce the best financial performance. Restaurant companies could use both 
company-owned and franchised units to leverage the strengths of one another, which will 
yield a better overall financial performance than if either structure was to operate alone. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, franchising is “a method of 
doing business by which a franchisee is granted the right to engage in offering, selling, or 
distributing goods or services under a marketing format which is designed by the 
franchiser.”  In the last few decades, franchising has become a part of everyday life in the 
United States. Many firms in a variety of industries have adopted franchising as a method 
of doing business. In 2001, PricewaterhouseCoopers estimated that there were more than 
767,000 businesses in the franchise system in the United States (U.S.), directly providing 
more than 9 million jobs, more than $229 billion in payroll, and more than $624 billion in 
output (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004). These businesses accounted for 3.2% of all U.S. 
business establishments.  In general, two major environmental factors have contributed to 
the development of franchising. First, the shift towards the service sector in developed 
economies requires a higher degree of personal service (Brandenberg, 1989; Hall & 
Dixon, 1988). The change in lifestyles in the United States and Western Europe has 
placed a growing emphasis on service and convenience. Second, higher travel intensity, 
which has enhanced the value of a brand name, also contributes to the expansion of 
franchising (Mathewson & Winter, 1985).  
Depending on the relationship between franchiser and franchisee, the franchising 
system can operate in two formats: product distribution franchising and business format 
franchising. Product distribution franchising is a relationship between the supplier and the 
dealer in which the franchiser grants the franchisee the right to use its trademark but may 
not provide a system to help the franchisee to run the business. Business format 
franchising, on the other hand, has an ongoing relationship between the franchiser and 
franchisee that not only includes product, service, and trademark, but also the entire 
concept of the business (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1988). Business format 
franchising is now much more widespread with 4.3 times as many establishments, 
providing 4 times as many jobs in 2001 as product distribution franchising 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004).  
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Not surprisingly, franchising also captures a sizeable portion of the restaurant 
industry and plays an important role in its success. According to PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(2004), more than 56% of fast-service restaurants and 13% of full-service restaurants are 
franchises. Consumer mobility and time constraints have increased the popularity of 
restaurant chains. To avoid losing time searching for a restaurant in unfamiliar locations, 
consumers are likely to select restaurants with national brand names over local 
restaurants (Mathewson & Winter, 1985; Sen, 1998). As a result, franchising has become 
a preferred method for expansion by many restaurant chains (Roh, 2002; Sen, 1998).  
Despite the popularity of franchising among restaurant firms, however, the 
existing research has not fully studied various issues pertaining to the franchise decision 
in the restaurant industry. Over the last 20 years, a significant amount of franchising 
research has been conducted in various disciplines, including economics, law, marketing, 
and management science. Of particular interest is the motivation for firms to franchise 
rather than to expand through company-owned units (Brickley & Dark, 1987; Lafontain 
& Kaufmann, 1994). To date, several theories explain why firms franchise. Often, 
however, those theories do not share a common conclusion and/or are not compatible 
with each other. For instance, the common argument for franchising is resource scarcity 
(Caves & Murphy, 1976; Oxenfeldt & Tompson, 1968; Ozanne & Hunt, 1971), a theory 
advocated by both academics and industry experts. This approach tends to view 
franchising as a means to access scarce resources as a firm grows. The premise is that 
firms prefer company ownership to manage growth because they can expect a higher rate 
of return from company-owned outlets. However, young, small, growing firms have 
limited access to capital markets and will thus use franchising to raise or conserve capital. 
Therefore, franchising enables a firm to grow more quickly than otherwise in a capital 
constrained environment (Combs & Ketchen, 2003; Sen, 1998).  
On the other hand, agency theory, another explanation for franchising, focuses on 
the efficiency of the incentive features of the franchise relationship (Carney & 
Geadjlovic, 1991; Combs & Ketchen, 1999; Norton, 1988; Rubin, 1978). According to 
agency theory, the advantage of franchising is that by transforming outlet managers into 
owners, franchising induces franchisees to maximize outlet profits and reduces the need 
for direct monitoring by the franchiser. Company-owned unit managers’ behavior should 
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require more monitoring than the behavior of franchised-owned outlet managers.  
Consequently, firms franchise to reduce the need to monitor outlet managers, and as 
firms age and grow, the overall percentage of franchising increases. 
Franchising offers a firm the benefits of vertical control over retail units without 
the investment in assets required by full integration. Nevertheless, many chains still 
choose full integration instead of franchising (e.g., Cheesecake Factory Inc. and P.F. 
Chang's China Bistro, Inc.). The debate continues among researchers: why do firms make 
the choice? Are there any firm-specific factors that affect the choice of organizational 
form? 
While previous studies (Brickely & Dark, 1987; Carney & Gedajlovic 1991; 
Combs & Ketchen, 1999; Norton, 1988; Sen, 1998) attempted to address these questions, 
they used variations in the proportion of company-owned outlets among franchised 
companies to study why firms franchise. The data from non-franchisers was not included, 
and the question of why firms choose not to franchise is therefore not addressed. In other 
words, including firm-level data from both franchisers and non-franchisers is necessary to 
examine the “initiating” decision (Combs et al., 2004). 
Another franchising-related research issue that has not been properly studied is 
the financial performance of the franchiser (Combs et al., 2004; Watson et al., 2005). A 
debate has developed among franchising practitioners, researchers, and support groups on 
the promise of the franchising method of distribution. On the one hand, many advocate 
franchising as a strategy for growth that limits the risk of failure. On the other hand, some 
researchers have questioned franchising success, claiming that it is no less risky than 
other methods of distribution or organizational forms (Alon et al., 2004). Generally, the 
existing empirical evidence of the financial performance of franchising is mixed 
(Aliouche & Schlentrich, 2005; Alon et al., 2004). Given the disagreement between the 
two research groups, a study using multiple performance measures to examine further the 
financial impact of franchising and factors that affect financial performance is needed. 
This work will not only expand our understanding of the effects of franchising, but also 
can provide information to management for their managerial and strategic decisions in 
the choice of organizational forms.  
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This study chose the restaurant industry as the field of study for various reasons. 
Franchising is the most prevalent organization form in this industry sector, both in term 
of dollar sales and number of outlets (Kostecka, 1988), providing sufficient samples for 
empirical analysis.  Furthermore, Bradach (1998) pointed out that the restaurant chains 
are an increasingly important force within the franchise industry. In 1995, fifteen of the 
twenty largest franchised chains were restaurants (“Top 50 Franchisers”, 1995), and 
nineteen restaurant chains exceeded sales of $1 billion (Lombardi, 1996). In addition to 
their market power, restaurant chains are especially useful to study because they 
represent a relatively mature segment of the fast-growing business-format chain industry 
(Bradach, 1998). Alon (2001) and Dant et al. (1996) also suggest that researchers should 
focus on franchising in particular industries because industry effects may confound 
investigated relationships. Therefore, concentrating on a single industry allows the 
researcher to obtain an in-depth understanding of the industry and to control for 
competitive and industry variations.  Finally, the restaurant industry has been the focus of 
much research (Combs & Ketchen, 1999; Hoover et al., 2003; Ketchen et al., 2006; Roh, 
2002; Sen, 1998), which serves as an excellent basis for this study. In summary, 
concentrating research on restaurant franchising can increase our knowledge of the 
hospitality sector, the marketing discipline, and franchising itself (Alon et al., 2004). 
 
Statement of Problem 
Combs, Michael and Castrogiovanni (2004) suggested three primary franchising 
research issues: franchise initiation, subsequent propensity to franchise, and franchise 
performance. Franchise initiation refers to the decision of whether to franchise an 
existing business or not.  For example, suppose a service business with growth potential 
and the service requires face-to-face contact with customers. In order to deliver the 
service economically to each customer, the business might need to develop a chain of 
geographically dispersed locations (Combs et al., 2004). The two common ways to grow 
a chain are internal development of firm-owned outlets and franchising. Thus, the first 
decision confronting the firm is whether or not to franchise their business. The 
subsequent propensity to franchise decision focuses on how much and where franchising 
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is used after initiation. Previous research on franchising has extensively investigated this 
second issue using industry-level data or sector-level data (Brickely & Dark, 1987; 
Carney & Gedajlovic, 1991; Combs & Ketchen, 1999; Norton, 1988; Sen, 1998). Less 
attention has been directed to identifying the factors that affect franchise initiation 
(Combs et al., 2004), and the empirical evidence of the effects of franchising on financial 
performance is scant (Aliouche & Schlentrich, 2005; Combs et al., 2004; Watson et al., 
2005). Consequently, the following issues are not well understood:  
 ● Why do firms franchise? Are there any factors that influence the choice of 
organizational forms? 
● Do franchised firms have better financial performance than non-franchised 
firms? 
● Are franchised firms less risky than non-franchised firms? 
● Does the proportion of franchised outlets to total outlets affect franchised 
firms’ financial performance? 
 
Purposes and Objectives 
The first purpose of this study was to apply several existing theoretical 
frameworks to investigate the factors that affect the choice of organizational forms thus 
providing insights to the franchising decision in the restaurant sector. The second purpose 
was to gain a complete understanding of the financial performance of franchising using 
multiple performance measures. Specifically, this study aimed to achieve the following 
goals in the restaurant industry:  
● To investigate the factors that affect the franchising decision. 
● To compare the accounting returns of franchised and non-franchised 
restaurant firms. 
● To compare risks of franchised and non-franchised restaurant firms. 
● To investigate whether the proportion of franchised outlets to total outlets 
(ownership mix) affects the financial performance of restaurant firms. 
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Significance of the Study 
Franchising has gained significant interest both in academia and industry. From 
the perspective of entrepreneurship, franchising is a vehicle to enter business ownership 
(Shane & Hoy, 1996). From the perspective of marketing, franchising is an important 
distribution channel (Dant et al., 1996; Kaufmann & Rangan, 1990). From the 
perspective of management, franchising is an important organizational form (Combs & 
Ketchen, 1999). According to Combs, Michael and Castrogiovanni (2004), three key 
franchising research issues should be studied to understand the franchise phenomenon: 
franchise initiation, subsequent propensity to franchise, and franchise performance. 
Extensive research has been conducted on whether franchising increases access to scarce 
resources or reduces monitoring costs and if this explains the propensity to franchise 
(e.g., Alon, 2001; Brickely & Dark, 1987; Combs & Castrogiovanni,1994; Hoover et al., 
2003; Lafontaine, 1992; Norton, 1988; Sen ,1998). Less attention has been paid to why 
firms initiate franchising and how franchising affects financial performance. Combs et al. 
(2004) suggested shifting research emphasis toward those two issues to provide guidance 
to the entrepreneur considering whether to franchise an existing business and to 
understand how franchising affects an organization’s performance. Responding to this 
call, this study applied existing theories (agency theory, resource scarcity theory, risk 
sharing theory, and specific knowledge theory) and used data from both franchised and 
non-franchised firms to investigate factors that might influence the decision. Multiple 
measures were selected to provide a more thorough assessment of the effects of 
franchising on financial performance.  
Figure 1.1 displays the research plan that highlights the procedure for conducting 
this dissertation project. Overall, this study contributes to the understanding of 
franchising in at least three ways. First, this study applied several theories (resource 
scarcity, agency theory, risk sharing theory, and specific knowledge theory) to explain 
franchising initiate to add to our understanding of the franchising decision. Second, this 
study used data from both franchised and non-franchised firms to investigate the factors 
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that affect the choice of different organizational form, not just data from franchised firms 
or industry aggregate data. As Combs et al. (2004) suggested, a complete model of the 
franchising decision requires understanding of  initiation at firm level from both 
franchisers and non-franchisers. Third, most previous studies used only sales, growth, or 
other single performance measures to investigate the effects of franchising on financial 
performance. This study used multiple measures, such as ROA, ROI, market-to-book 
ratio, and Tobin’s Q, to provide a more thorough assessment. Moreover, this study also 
investigated whether a firm’s proportion of franchised outlets to total outlets affects its 
financial performance. In summary, this study makes theoretical and empirical 
contributions to the understanding of why firms franchise, and provides information to 
guide restaurant managers in deciding whether franchising is an appropriate choice for 
their companies, as well as provide investors the information to evaluate their investment 
decisions.   
Research Hypotheses 
To achieve the objectives of the study, the following hypotheses were developed 
and investigated. The theoretical background of these hypotheses is presented in Chapter 
2 of this proposal.  
H1: Franchised firms in the restaurant industry are more geographically dispersed than 
non-franchised firms. 
H2: Franchised firms are larger in terms of number of outlets than non-franchised firms. 
H3: Franchised firms are more likely to be involved in foreign expansion than non-
franchised firms. 
H4: Franchised firms have a higher growth rate than non-franchised firms. 
H5: Franchised firms have a lower debt-to-equity ratio than non-franchised firms. 
H6: Franchised firms were younger when they started franchising than non-franchised 
firms.  
H7: Franchised firms are less risky than non-franchised firms. 
H8: Quick service restaurants are more likely to be franchised than other types of 
restaurants.  
H9: Franchised firms have better financial performance than non-franchised firms. 
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H10: There is a nonlinear relationship between the proportion of franchised outlets and 
financial performance. 
H11: The proportion of franchised units moderates the relationship between advertising 
and financial performance. 
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Figure 1 Research Plan 
 
Review Franchising-Related Theoretical 
Frameworks (Chapter 2) 
 
Agency Theory             Resource Scarcity Theory 
Risk Sharing Theory     Specific Knowledge Theory
Identify Relevant Variables (Chapter 2) 
 
 
Franchise decision factors (Section 2.1) 
Financial performance measures  (Section 2.2) 
Develop Research Hypotheses  
(Chapter 2) 
 
Franchised vs. Non-franchised differentiation (H1 – H8) (Section 
2.1)  
Financial Performance (H9 – H11) (Section 2.2) 
Perform Data Collection 
(Chapter 3.3) 
Develop Statistical Models  
(Chapter 3.1 & 3.2) 
 
‧ Franchising decision – Univariate tests, Logit Model 
(Section 3.1) 
‧ Financial performance – t-tests, Multiple regression  
(Section 3.2)
Define Research Questions & Significance  
(Chapter 1)  
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Definitions of Terms 
Franchising: franchising is a method of doing business by which a franchisee is 
granted the right to engage in offering, selling, or distributing goods or services under a 
marketing format designed by the franchiser (The U.S. Department of Commerce). 
Franchiser: the franchiser is the individual or business granting the business 
rights to other individual or business (Justis & Judd, 1998). 
Franchisee: the franchisee is the individual or business granted the right to 
operate in accordance with the chosen method to produce or sell the product or service 
(Justis & Judd, 1998) 
Quick-Service Restaurants: This study adapts the description of quick-service 
restaurants from Spears and Gregoire (2006): 
“Quick-service restaurants provide a limited number of food items to a customer 
in a relative short period of time. Often the customer orders food at a counter and pays for 
it before eating. These restaurants are targeting working professionals and parents who 
want to have a meal served quickly at a low price.” (p. 13) 
Ownership Mix: The mix of company-owned and franchised outlets (Lafontaine 
& Kaufmann, 1994). 
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CHAPTER 2 - REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
One of the most debated topics in franchising research is why a firm chooses to 
franchise rather than expand through company-owned units (Elango & Fried, 1997). 
Several theories have been applied to explain why firms franchise. This chapter reviews 
the theoretical foundation of the franchising decision based on agency theory, resource 
scarcity theory, risk sharing theory, and specific knowledge theory. The research 
hypotheses were developed based on various theories.   
 
 Theoretical Development 
 Agency theory 
The most prevalent explanation for franchising is agency theory. According to 
agency theory, an agency relationship exists whenever one party (the principal) delegates 
authority to another (the agent) to perform the work (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The agent’s and the principal’s self interests may not be the same; 
hence, a conflict of interest may exist, and the principal must expend resources to insure 
that agents act in the principal’s best interest. Agency theory focuses on the ability of the 
principal to monitor the behavior of an agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). The general problem 
with monitoring arises when it is difficult or expensive to conduct and when differences 
exist in risk preference and goals between the principal and agent (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Because owners (principals) are compensated through residual claims on the 
profits of the firm and employees (agents) are compensated through wages, each is 
motivated differently and may behave differently (Eisenhardt, 1989; Shane, 1998).  As a 
result, under conditions of uncertainty, the principals have to bear monitoring costs to 
ensure that employees are acting in the principals’ best interest (Shane, 1998).  
Agency theory partitions behavioral uncertainty into two parts: moral hazard and 
adverse selection (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Moral hazard refers to the potential for 
agents to act in their own interest against the objectives of the principal when the 
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principal cannot adequately monitor agents’ actions (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agents can 
engage in two types of moral hazard: sub-optimal effort and misdirected effort (Shane, 
1998). Since managers’ (the agents) compensation is fixed, they may tend to shirk their 
duties. They also have incentive to misdirect effort to personal goals such as obtaining 
bonuses or leisure time (Shane, 1998).  
Another part of behavior uncertainty, adverse selection, involves the agent 
misrepresenting his or her abilities (Eisenhardt, 1989). The problem of adverse selection 
arises as a result of difficulty verifying the abilities of the employee. Potential employees 
have an incentive to cause the principal to believe that they have appropriate skills, 
training, and backgrounds for jobs. Given the incentive for adverse selection, firms must 
incur costs in gathering information to determine which jobs are appropriate to which 
new employees (Prescott & Visscher, 1980). The cost of gathering information to 
overcome an adverse selection problem grows as a firm grows. 
To overcome these problems of behavioral uncertainty, agency theory offers two 
solutions. One is to invest in information systems such as budgeting systems, reporting 
procedures, boards of directors, and additional layers of management. Such an investment 
will reveal the agent’s behavior to the principal. The more information the principal has, 
the harder it becomes for an agent to shirk duties or to misrepresent his/her abilities.  The 
other option is to replace the wage contract with a hybrid organizational arrangement that 
provides a residual claim to an agent. Such an outcome-based contract aligns the goals of 
the agent and the principal and reduces the problems of moral hazard and adverse 
selection (Eisenhardt, 1988; Jensen, 1983; Shane, 1998). Franchising represents one type 
of outcome-based contract. 
In summary, agency theory holds that managers (the agents) will tend to shirk 
their duties because their compensation is fixed. As a result, the firm will incur higher 
monitoring costs to ensure that managers act in the firm’s best interests. In contrast, in a 
franchise agreement, the franchisee purchases the right to profit from a particular unit by 
paying franchise fees and royalties to the franchiser. Franchisees are the owner-managers 
who bear the residual of risk of a local operation. Since owner-managers of franchised 
units are compensated by residual claims from their particular units and they put their 
own capital at risk, they are more motivated to maximize the present value of the 
 15
franchise because effective management is the only way to recover the investment with 
acceptable long-run returns (Shane, 1996).  Franchising provides firms a hybrid 
organizational form to minimize the costs of monitoring managers (Rubin, 1978).  
Agency theory has received support from many empirical studies. For example, 
Brickley and Dark (1987) found that the cost of monitoring store managers seems to be 
the most important factor in making the franchise decisions. They suggested that 
franchising is more efficient than using company-owned outlets when it is difficult for 
the firms to monitor the behavior of individual outlets and when environmental 
uncertainty exists. Brickely, Dark and Weisbach (1991) found that the likelihood of 
franchising decreases as monitoring costs go down. Using publicly-traded restaurant 
chains between 1992 and 1995, Combs and Ketchen (1999) concluded that firms with 
high outlet-level asset specificity, low specific knowledge, and high geographic 
dispersion used franchising significantly more than other firms. Lafontaine (1992) also 
suggested geographic dispersion and increasing importance of the franchisee’s inputs also 
increase franchisers’ propensity to franchise, thus supporting agency theory. 
The literature seems to agree that geographic dispersion is an important factor that 
increases monitoring costs under company ownership and thereby encourages 
franchising. As a firm enters geographic markets far removed from headquarters, the cost 
of monitoring outlet managers increases because more monitoring personnel are required 
and because travel-related expenses grow (Carney & Gedajlovic, 1991). Thus, companies 
that operate over a greater geographical area have more challenges in monitoring their 
outlets and controlling their operations and will prefer to franchise rather than own units 
in their system (Combs & Castrogiovanni, 1994; Norton, 1988). Accordingly, this study 
proposed the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Franchised firms in the restaurant industry are more geographically dispersed    
than non-franchised firms. 
 
Another important variable frequently used in agency theory is system size. Many 
studies have found that system size is positively related to franchising (Combs & 
Ketchen, 2003). According to the agency theory, firms use franchising to minimize 
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monitoring costs as they expand into new and distant markets. As firms grow, the 
entrepreneurs must hire employees to undertake activities that the entrepreneurs 
themselves do not have time to undertake. Hiring new employees may increase adverse 
selection and moral hazard. Agency theory suggests that the more units in the system, the 
harder it is to monitor and control units, and the more likely firms will engage in 
franchising (Shane, 1998; Combs & Ketchen, 2003; Alon, 2001). In view of that, this 
study proposed the following hypothesis: 
 
H2:  Franchised restaurant firms are larger in terms of number of outlets than non-
franchised restaurant firms. 
 
Another commonly-cited factor for franchising in the increasing cost of 
monitoring is foreign expansion. In international operations, distance and time increase 
the level of uncertainty due to the information gap. It is very difficult and costly to gather 
and receive information about foreign operations in a timely manner. Moreover, cultural 
differences may increase the cost of gathering information (Fladmoe-Lindquist & Jacque, 
1995). According to Hoover et al. (2003), firms encounter two types of costs when they 
own their own foreign units. First, expatriate managers are themselves a considerable 
cost. Expatriates are typically paid a premium as compensation for relocating their 
families to live in an unfamiliar culture. Second, cultural differences might mean that 
expatriate managers cannot adapt adequately to address local preferences. Using the 
percentage of total growth achieved through franchising that occurred in 91 restaurant 
chains between 1991 and 1993, Hoover et al. (2003) found foreign expansion increased 
the propensity to franchise. Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque (1995) also suggested that 
more geographic distance involved in monitoring foreign agents and more cultural 
distance meant that franchise arrangements were more likely. Accordingly, this study 
proposed the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: Franchised restaurants in the restaurant industry are more likely to involve in 
foreign expansion than non-franchised restaurant firms. 
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  Resource scarcity theory 
Another popular explanation for franchising is resource scarcity theory. 
According to resource scarcity theory, franchising is designed to provide franchisers with 
the resources necessary to accelerate growth to reach minimum efficient scale and build 
brand name capital (Hunt, 1973; Norton, 1995; Oxenfeldt & Thompson, 1968). In 
particular, franchising can ease the financial constraints of growth and expansion in 
small- to medium-sized firms because the franchisee supplies the financing and the 
resources to facilitate franchiser growth (Caves & Murphy, 1976; Oxenfeldt & 
Thompson, 1968). Unlike a company-owned outlet, a franchised store is operated by a 
franchisee, an independent legal entity. Franchisees provide cash to the franchiser in the 
form of franchise fees and royalties, and provide investment in the outlet through the 
purchase of fixed assets (Lafontaine & Kaufmann, 1994). This not only relieves the 
franchiser of the need to raise cash for growth, but can also conserve capital and more 
quickly establish a distribution channel (Mcquire & Staelin, 1983). In addition to 
providing capital to franchisers, franchisees also offer managerial talent and local 
knowledge to fuel franchise growth (Minkler, 1992; Norton, 1988; Shane, 1998). 
According to Shane (1998), the franchise contract makes franchisee wealth depend 
mostly on the residual income at individual outlets. A franchisee invests a significant 
amount of money and time into his/her unit; thus, he/she is likely to purchase a franchise 
only if he/she has confidence in his/her own managerial abilities. Consequently, 
franchising can screen out applicants who lack the necessary managerial skills (Norton, 
1988). Thus, franchising can help franchisers attract the requisite human capital for 
growth in a relative short time. Franchising also allows a firm to leverage its franchisees’ 
local market knowledge as a firm expands into new geographic areas (Minkler, 1992).  
Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1968) proposed that firms prefer wholly-owned operations 
to franchising, because they can expect higher rates of return from company-owned 
outlets. However, the desire to achieve economies of scale pressures firms to expand at a 
rate that may not be possible using internally-generated resources. Thus, young, small, 
and growing firms will use franchising to expand until they reach sufficient critical mass 
to generate economies of scale. Specifically, as the firm generates sufficient capital 
internally, the franchiser will focus on maximizing each outlet’s returns. New franchising 
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will cease, and the franchiser would try to repurchase its most profitable outlets from 
franchisee. Eventually, a successful franchise system will become a company-owned 
chain.  
Several empirical studies have supported using resource scarcity theory to explain 
franchise decision. In particular, they agree with Oxenfeldt and Kelly’s (1969) suggestion 
for the phenomena of franchise redirection.  For instance, Hunt (1973) found an 
aggregate trend towards company-operated units in the fast food franchising industry. 
Larger and older franchise systems increased the percentage of company-owned units 
between 1960 and 1971. Caves and Murphy (1976) observed a similar trend in company 
ownership in maturing industries.  Anderson (1984) also concluded that the percentage of 
units owned by convenience stores and restaurant franchisers increased over a period of 
ten years. Sen (1998) investigated the use of franchising as a growth strategy in the US 
restaurant industry and found a close relationship between the use of franchising and 
outlet growth within the restaurant industry.  His results also show larger chains used less 
franchising in their expansion strategies. By surveying franchisers, Dant (1995) revealed 
that capital scarcity influenced the initial decision to use franchising, supporting the 
leverage of franchising to overcome resource constraints argument. Martin and Justis 
(1993) examined how interest rates affect franchising, finding that franchising rises as 
interest rates increase and falls when rates decrease. Combs and Ketchen (1999) studied 
91 publicly-traded restaurant chains, revealing that companies with capital constraints 
were more likely to use franchising for expansion. More recently, Alon (2001) also 
argued that firms with fewer resources rely more on franchising. 
Despite this support in the literature, the resource scarcity theory has received stiff 
criticism from economists who suggest that franchising is an inefficient way to raise 
capital compared to capital markets (Norton, 1995; Rubin, 1978). For instance, Rubin 
(1978) argued that selling shares in the whole chain is a more efficient solution to the 
capital problem than franchising, because franchisees invest a significant portion of their 
net worth in one or a few outlets in the same area. As a result, the investment of the 
franchisee is much riskier than the overall franchise chain. It is more likely that the 
franchisee will demand a higher rate of return on his capital from the franchiser, resulting 
in a lower return for the franchiser. Responding to Rubin’s (1978) argument, Lafontaine 
 19
(1992) suggested that franchisee capital might not come at a higher risk premium after 
all. She pointed out that franchisees have more incentives to exert effort than employees 
when they invest their own capital. Investors might recognize this motivational difference 
and would, therefore, demand higher rates of return. Hence, capital obtained from 
franchisees may be less expensive than capital from investors. 
In summary, most of extant studies support the resource scarcity theory for 
franchising, despite some criticism of this theory. According to resource scarcity theory, 
franchising allows the franchised firm to use the franchisee’s managerial and financial 
resources to grow rapidly (Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969). 
Franchising also reduces franchised firms’ time and effort in identifying and training new 
managers, which is a major constraint to growth (Penrose, 1959). Many studies have 
found that franchising reduces franchisers’ time and effort in selecting outlet managers 
and increases franchisers’ growth (Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; Shane, 1998; Thompson, 
1994).  Dant (1995) concluded that entrepreneurs perceive the opportunity for rapid 
growth as an important reason to franchise. Accordingly, the following hypothesis was 
developed: 
 
H4: Franchised restaurant firms have higher growth rates than non-franchised 
restaurant firms. 
 
Resource scarcity theory supports the idea that franchising is a relatively 
inexpensive way to expand operations, by increasing revenue through franchise fees, 
royalties, and sales to franchisees, and by substituting the franchisees’ investment in local 
operations for the parent company’s investment in the local operations. Hunt (1973) 
stated that firms choose to franchise units because they simply do not have access to the 
capital required to expand via company owned units. Norton (1995) argued the costs of 
debt should be higher and the debt/equity ratios should be lower for franchised 
companies, because of higher growth opportunities, more advertising, more intangible 
capital, and asymmetric information could generate higher costs of both debt and equity, 
and franchising is common where growth opportunities, advertising, intangible capital, 
and asymmetric information are substantial.  In support of this idea, using a sample of 25 
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franchisers and a companion group of 25 non-franchisers, Norton (1995) found non-
franchisers have higher debt-to-equity ratios than franchisers, thus showing the relevance 
of capital structure in situations where franchising is common. Accordingly, the 
following hypothesis was developed: 
 
H5: Franchised restaurant firms have lower debt-to-equity ratios than non-
franchised restaurant firms. 
 
Finally, the resource scarcity theory also suggests that franchising varies over an 
organization’s life cycle (Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969). Young, small, growing, and less 
liquid firms use franchising more to increase the flow of scarce resources (Alon, 2001; 
Anderson, 1984; Carney & Gedajovic, 1991; Comb & Ketchen, 1999; Hunt, 1973; 
Martin & Justis, 1993; Shane, 1998). In contrast, larger, older, firms with liquid capital 
reduce their proportion of franchised units. If resource scarcity is a major reason for 
franchising, we should find that franchised firms started their first franchised unit at 
younger age than non-franchised firms. Thus, based on the resource scarcity theory, this 
study proposed the following hypotheses: 
 
H6: Franchised restaurant firms are younger when they started franchising than 
non-franchised restaurant firms.  
 
 Risk- sharing theory  
Another theory behind franchising is the risk-sharing theory.  Previous research 
has suggested that franchise contracts arise principally from the need to share risks 
(Lafontaine & Bhattacharyya, 1995). Namely, franchising allows franchisers and 
franchisees to share the risk of the future success of the franchised units.  
According to risk-sharing theory, franchising allows franchisers to maintain 
control over profitable units with more predictable revenue while shedding relative risky 
locations with uncertain revenues (Combs & Castrogiovanni, 1994). Much research has 
provided empirical support for risk sharing by revealing that franchised units are 
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frequently located in remote locations with lower sales per unit than company-owned 
units (Brickley & Dark, 1987; Martin, 1988). For example, using data obtained from 
Franchise Annual and the Source Book of Franchise Opportunities, Martin (1988) found 
that franchisers tend to own or buy back the more profitable and less risky outlets and to 
franchise the less profitable and more risky outlets.  
 In addition, the input of franchisee capital into the business can reduce the capital 
investment required from franchisers and, consequently, reduce the capital requirements 
and capital risk (Lafontaine & Kaufmann, 1994). Moreover, franchising can reduce the 
volatility of franchisers’ cash flow and risk. The cash flow from franchising is derived 
from sales-based royalties. Since sales revenue is never below zero, a sharing 
arrangement can reduce the franchiser’s business risk, because the income stream is 
largely unaffected by any cost inefficiencies on the part of the franchisee (Caves and 
Murphy, 1976). For example, as Robert Nugent, CEO of Jack in the Box, noted “The 
economic advantage to franchising is that there is less risk to our income statement 
because we’re not affected by the cost pressures” (Bradach, 1998, p. 68). On the other 
hand, a company-owned unit requires fixed capital investment, which increases the firm’s 
operating leverage and risk. Overall, franchises provide firms with lower risk, low-cost 
access to markets that are not economically worthwhile for them to pursue through 
vertically integrated channels (Dahlstrom & Nygaard, 1994).   
The risk-sharing argument has been supported in several studies. Norton (1988) 
used the root mean square error of change in sales to measure the risk and found that risk 
has a positive effect on franchisers’ use of franchising. Using sector data from the U.S. 
Department of Commerce’s Franchising in the Economy, Lafontaine (1992) found that 
risk increases the use of franchising and decreases the franchiser’s share. Roh (2002) 
used the 3-year variance of operating cash flows to measure risk. He also found that risk 
decreases as the propensity to franchise units increases, supporting the risk-sharing 
argument. In summary, the investment of capital and manpower by franchisees in their 
outlets means that franchising requires less financial investment by franchisers and 
involves less capital risk than a company-owned network. Based on the risk-sharing 
argument, this study proposed the following hypothesis: 
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H7: Franchised restaurant firms are less risky than non-franchised restaurant 
firms. 
 
 Specific knowledge theory 
 
The literature also suggests the transfer of specific knowledge between the 
principal and agent is another factor that might affect the franchise decision.  Specific 
knowledge refers to the knowledge required to efficiently handle operations, improve 
efficiency, and promote products and services (Combs & Ketchen, 1999; Hoover et al., 
2003). According to the specific knowledge explanation, the franchise appears to work 
best where operations are relatively simple and repetitive. In the service sector, 
homogeneity is a problem, so a company should be less inclined to use franchising when 
specific knowledge required in the job is high (Hoover et al., 2003). Michael (1996) also 
suggests that franchising does not fully utilize the franchisee’s human capital. To use 
human capital to its fullest, the local operator and franchisee should make all decisions 
individually, forfeiting gains from standardization and scale. By contrast, the 
standardized product delivered by the franchise system requires that the franchiser make 
decisions such as marketing and product design centrally, without using the franchisee’s 
human capital. Thus, industries that do not benefit from standardization will not 
franchise. Thus, the more important human capital is to production, the less likely the 
company is to franchise. Watson, Kirby, and Egan (2002) found that industries with high 
levels of franchise operations tend to have lower average earnings, suggesting lower 
human capital requirement. Hoover et al. (2003) suggested that as specific knowledge 
decreases, franchising increases.   
The relationship between specific knowledge and franchise decisions has 
important implications for the format of quick-service restaurants. The common attributes 
of restaurant products and services are intangibility and heterogeneity. Intangibility 
creates a greater perceived risk for customers, who must rely on the promise of 
satisfaction without the opportunity to return the purchase, while heterogeneity implies a 
lack of uniformity of the service. In this regard, the challenge for restaurant firms is to 
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maintain control of quality and standards, keeping both aspects consistent throughout the 
entire organization.  Among various types of restaurants, the specific knowledge required 
by quick-service restaurants is less intensive because of their limited menus and minimal 
customer service. Many quick service restaurant chains adopt a production line approach 
(e.g., McDonalds, Wendy’s, Burger King) to simplify their production and reduce service 
variability (Bowen & Lawler, 1992; Power, 1992). By doing so, fast food service is, in 
many ways, like a manufacturing system rather than a traditional restaurant. Accordingly, 
this study proposes the following hypothesis: 
 
H8: Quick service restaurants are more likely to be franchised than other types of 
restaurants.  
 
 Financial Performance 
The rapid growth of franchising has attracted the interest of researchers from a 
variety of academic fields (Elango & Fried, 1997). Most of the franchising literature has 
focused on the motivation for franchising (Anderson, 1984; Alon, 2001; Carney & 
Gedajovic, 1991; Comb & Ketchen, 1999; Hunt, 1973; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; Martin 
& Justis, 1993; Shane, 1998), plural form development (Bradach, 1997; Dant & 
Kaufmann, 2003), and the success and failure of franchising firms (Bates, 1995). 
However, financial performance has not been properly explored in the franchising 
literature (Combs et al, 2004; Watson et al., 2005). The dominant theories explaining the 
franchising phenomenon indicate that firms choosing to expand through franchising may 
have significant advantages over firms that grow through a corporate chain as described 
in the previous sections.  
Overall, the literature suggests many potential advantages to the franchising 
model of growth. First, by reducing resource constraints, the franchisee finances the 
necessary investments, freeing the franchiser from the capital expense. Second, in 
providing managerial expertise, site managers invest in the site as the franchisee and earn 
profit after franchising fees, which allows most franchise managers to dedicate 
themselves to monitoring their business. Third, in most cases, the franchisee has better 
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knowledge of local market conditions, allowing a franchiser to leverage local market 
knowledge as it expands to new areas. Fourth, economy of scale in purchasing can be 
achieved more rapidly by a company choosing franchising than a company that expands 
through company-owned units (Aliouche & Schlentrich, 2005, Justis & Judd, 1998; 
Spinelli, et al., 2003).  Aliouche and Schlentrich (2005) noted that low capital costs, 
motivated managerial expertise, and better local market knowledge are the key resources 
that can reduce a franchiser’s overall risk and should have a significant positive impact 
on a franchiser’s financial performance.  
Given the success and popularity of franchising, it may seem obvious that 
franchising may help firms achieve superior financial performance. However, franchising 
practitioners, researchers, and support groups debate whether franchising can enhance a 
firm’s financial performance through superior value creation (Alon et al., 2004). To 
address this question, a few studies have been conducted to compare the financial 
performance of franchised and non-franchised firms with inconclusive results. Spinelli, 
Birley and Leleux (2003) compared the monthly total returns (dividend plus capital 
gains) of 91 U.S. publicly held franchisers with the Standard and Poor’s 500 Index 
between 1990 and 1999. They concluded that between January 1991 and July 1997, the 
franchiser index outperformed the S&P 500. However, for the remaining period the S&P 
outperformed the public franchiser index, eliminating all of the public franchiser’s 
previous advantage. Aliouche and Schlentrich (2005) used Economic Value Added 
(EVA) and Market Value Added (MVA) to compare the financial performance of 24 U.S. 
public restaurant franchisers to 17 non-franchisers’ performance. They found that 95.8% 
of the franchisers created market value versus 88.2% of the non-franchiser, and 62.5% of 
the franchisers created economic value versus 58.8% of the non-franchisers. They also 
found, on average, a franchiser created $363.4 million in market value and $13.3 million 
in economic value, while a non-franchiser created $144.3 million in market value and 
$3.2 million in economic value. They concluded that between 1993 and 2002, U.S. public 
restaurant franchisers have created more value than their non-franchiser competitors, and 
franchisers created a slightly higher market value and economic value than non-
franchisers. Alon, Drtina, and Gilbert (2004) used the DuPont model to find the mean 
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return on equity (ROE) was 7.29% for non-franchised firms and 6.61% for franchised 
firms, but the difference between these means was not statistically significant.  
To further investigate whether franchising can enhance a firm’s financial 
performance and generate long-term economic profit to enhance shareholder value, this 
study will use multiple performance measures to compare franchised and non-franchised 
firms’ performance. There are several methods for measuring financial performance, and 
each valuation method has its own strengths and weaknesses. One method of determining 
financial performance is to measure the market-to-book ratio and Tobin’s Q (Day and 
Fahey, 1988). The market-to-book ratio and Tobin’s Q approximate the stock market’s 
perception of the value of the firm’s present and future income and growth potential 
(Montgomery et al., 1984). Another method that can be used used to indicate financial 
performance is accounting returns. Return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) 
are the usual measures of financial performance (Dickerson et al., 1997). The advantages 
of ROA and ROE are that (1) as ratios, they make possible the comparison of 
organizations of different sizes and (2) they are often publicly reported (McKee et al., 
1989). 
As discussed in this chapter, extant theory assumes that franchising allows the 
franchised firm to use the franchisee’s managerial and financial resources to grow 
rapidly, to reduce capital requirements, to reduce monitoring costs, and to reduce risk 
(Alon, 2001; Anderson, 1984; Brickely et al., 1991; Carney & Gedajovic, 1991; Comb & 
Ketchen, 1999; Hunt, 1973; Lafontaine & Bhattacharyya, 1995; Martin, 1988; Martin & 
Justis, 1993; Shane, 1998; Srinivasan, 2006). Hence, franchising should increase a firm’s 
return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). In addition, from the shareholder 
value point of view, franchising is useful in managing demand growth and uncertainty, 
creating relational, knowledge, and intellectual assets that can increase future cash flows 
while reducing risk (Sirivansan, 2006; Srivastava et al., 1998). Therefore, franchising 
should increase a firm’s intangible value. Based on the literature and previous finding, 
this study developed the following hypothesis: 
 
H9: Franchised restaurant firms have superior financial performance than non-
franchised restaurant firms. 
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 Another issue in the franchise performance is whether increasing the number of 
franchised units can increase a franchiser’s financial performance. In particular, what is 
the optimal mix of ownership that can maximize a firm’s shareholder value? According 
to agency theory, managers will tend to shirk their duties because their compensation is 
fixed. As a result, higher monitoring costs are incurred to ensure managers act in the 
firm’s best interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Franchising can solve this problem 
because franchisees are the owner-managers who bear the residual of risk of a local 
operation; they are more motivated to maximize the present value of the franchise 
because effective management is the only way to recover the investment with an 
acceptable long-run return (Shane, 1998). Therefore, the agency theory suggests that 
franchising should be the preferred method and franchising firms should perform better 
than those that retain ownership when conditions create a risk of shirking (Lafontaine, 
1992; Shane, 1998; Sorenson & Sorensen, 2001). In addition, the risk-sharing theory 
suggests that investing franchisee capital in the business can reduce the capital 
investment required from franchisers, thus reducing franchisers’ capital requirements and 
risks.  As the Executive vice-president of a leading fish and chips chain remarked, 
“…with franchise units, you receive a smaller margin but the return on investment 
approaches infinity because there is no investment” (Bradach, 1998, p. 68). Therefore, 
restaurant firms with a high degree of franchising should perform better than non-
franchised firms and franchising firms with a low degree of franchising.  
Despite these advantages, franchising also creates certain disadvantages compared 
to company owned units. For example, franchisees might pursue personal benefits by 
reducing quality within their units to save costs and increase profits, while the losses by 
providing lower quality products or services are borne by other franchisees damaging the 
franchiser’ brand name. Other disadvantages include less control over business processes, 
products, and profit in franchised units than in company owned units (Heide, 1994).  
Many researchers argue that franchising and company-owned systems are not 
opposing but rather complementary organizational forms (Cliquet & Croizean, 2002; 
Sorenson & Sorensen, 2001). Using the organizational learning theory, Sorenson and 
Sorensen (2001) also contented that companies can gain the benefits of innovation and 
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knowledge transfer by having both company-owned units and franchised units. In a 
survey, Lafontaine and Kaufmann (1994) found that franchisors intend to continue to 
operate a combination of company-owned and franchised outlets. Bradach and Eccles 
(1989) stated that the existence of both company-owned outlets and franchised outlets 
positively affects the management of the other side of the business. Having franchised 
units can provide a source of market knowledge and innovative ideas that can be 
incorporated into the company owned units (Lafontaine & Kaufmann, 1994) and 
company-owned outlets allows companies to test policies and programs, and gain 
knowledge of operational details (Dant & Kaufmann, 2003). The experience gained from 
company-owned outlets also could be used to negotiate more control of the franchisees 
(Dant & Schul, 1992). Therefore, retaining a combination of company-owned and 
franchisees-owned outlets creates a synergy. A full company-owned system and a full 
franchised system may be unable to produce the best financial performance for a firm. 
Therefore, it is possible that a firm’s financial performance improve as the proportion of 
its franchised outlets increase. Nonetheless, after a certain percentage, the financial 
performance might again decrease due to the increasing proportion of franchised outlets. 
Accordingly, this study proposed the following hypothesis: 
 
H10: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the proportion of 
franchised outlets and financial performance. 
 
Another issue related to franchising financial performance, one this study will 
investigate, is whether the proportion of franchised outlets moderates the relationship 
between advertising and financial performance. In general, advertising expenditures 
affect the value of an organization’s intangible assets (Chauvin & Hirschey, 1993; Rao et 
al., 2004; Simon & Sullivan, 1993). Advertising can create market-based assets that may 
lower the costs of sales, create price premiums through brand equity, and generate 
competitive barriers, and therefore increase a firm’s cash flows and intangible value 
(Srivastava et al., 1998). Brand name capital is the most important asset owned by a 
franchiser (Roh, 2002). In the restaurant industry, where asset intangibility is high, 
having a strong corporate logo, standardized facilities, etc. helps reduce intangibility in 
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the consumer’s mind (Cross & Walker, 1987). Many franchisers use franchising as 
vehicle to penetrate markets and build brand name capital rapidly (Anderson, 1984). 
When a firm with more advertising also has a large proportion of franchised outlets, its 
advertising may be more effective because it can cover a large market and increase its 
level of brand equity (Srinivasan, 2006). Therefore, the higher the firm’s advertising 
expenditures and the higher the proportion of its franchised outlets, the higher its 
intangible value should be.  
However, franchising also creates the problem of free riding. Free riding problem 
arises when a franchisee does not deliver the guaranteed quality imposed by the franchise 
agreement. With inferior products and services, the franchisee can reduce the costs of his 
or her operation and increase profits; however, such actions can negatively affect the 
firm’s product perception, its brand name, and its performance. Mathewson and Winter 
(1985) observed that the incentive for a franchisee to free ride increases with the rise in 
the franchiser’s brand name strength. By examining evidence from both the restaurant 
and the hotel industries, Micheal (2000) also found that quality is negatively related to 
the percent franchising in the chain. His results suggest that the franchise contract 
increases free-riding and decreases quality in a decentralized service chain. Thus when a 
firm with more advertising and also has a higher proportion of franchised outlets, the 
increased free riding problems may reduce its intangible assets. Given these two opposite 
effects, this study hypothesized the following: 
 
H11: The proportion of franchise units moderates the relationship between 
advertising and financial performance. 
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CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY 
 The preceding chapter presented the underlying theoretical arguments for the 
franchise decision. This chapter discusses testing franchising based on those theories and 
the related empirical evidence discussed in the preceding chapter. Several statistical 
models were developed for investigating the financial performance differences between 
franchised and non-franchised companies. The purpose of this chapter is to specify an 
procedure to accomplish the objectives of the research. A set of variables was identified 
to best differentiate firms engaged in franchise contracts from those that are not. Specific 
data from individual restaurant firms were used in this study. Although an analysis of a 
homogeneous industry such as the restaurant industry does not necessarily extrapolate to 
other industries, the major advantage of this approach is that we can control for 
competitive environment and industry variations. 
Section 1 presents the data collection procedure. Section 2 defines variables and 
discusses the statistical models regarding the franchise decision. Finally, section 3 
describes the variables and the statistical models used for testing the financial 
performance of franchised and non-franchised firms.  
 
 Data Collection 
This research used secondary data for statistical analysis. The sample for this 
study consisted of publicly-held restaurant companies. All the publicly-held restaurant 
firms whose stocks were traded in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX), and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations (NASDAQ) system from 1996 to 2005 and had share price information 
available on the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database were included in 
this study. The financial data used in this study were retrieved from the Standard and 
Poor’s COMPUSTAT database, which provides annual accounting and stock market 
information for publicly traded firm on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ, for the years 
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1996 through 2005, using SIC code 5812 for the restaurant sector. This database is one of 
the most widely used secondary data sources for academic researchers. 
Data on the number of units, the number of states, foreign operations, and the 
percentage of franchised units to total units were collected from Bond’s Franchise Guide 
and 10 K reports. Advertising expenditures data for the same time period were obtained 
from Advertising Ratios and Budgets published by Schonfeld & Associates, Inc.  
Advertising Ratios and Budgets covers publicly-traded companies and is based on the 
data from government filings and published  
 
 Franchise Decision Model 
 Variable specification   
As detailed in the literature review, this study hypothesized that several variables 
synthesized from agency theory, resource scarcity theory, risk sharing theory, and 
specific knowledge theory would differentiate firms engaged in franchising from those 
that do not. If franchising companies are motivated by the desire to reduce monitoring 
costs, to raise capital, and to share risk, then the selected variables should exhibit 
measurable differences between the samples of franchised and non-franchised companies. 
To address the research questions, both univariate and multivariate methods were used. 
Dependent variable. The primary objective of this study is to identify what 
motivates a company to pursue franchise contracts rather than keeping all restaurants 
wholly company-owned. Thus, the firms can be classified into two mutually exclusive 
categories. The dependent variable used in this study is discrete in nature and involves a 
situation in which one alternative or the other must be chosen. The dependent variable, 
franchising, is a dummy variable with 1 for the franchised firms and 0 for non-franchised 
firms. 
Agency theory variables. The number of states in which the firm has operations 
was used as proxy variable for the geographic dispersion, a factor that has been studied 
extensively in retail chains (e.g., Combs & Ketchen, 1999; Lafontaine, 1992; Carney & 
Gedajlovic, 1991), to test hypothesis H1. The number of units of the firm was used as a 
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proxy variable to measure size to test hypothesis H2, and the number of countries in 
which the firm has operations was used to test hypothesis H3. 
Resource scarcity theory variables. The percentage change in the number of 
units per year was used as a proxy variable for growth to test Hypothesis H4. The total 
debt-to-equity ratio was used to test Hypothesis H5. For franchised companies, the year 
the company started its first franchise was used to measure age and was used as a 
surrogate for the degree of system maturity and thus as a measure of a franchisor’s access 
to resources (Lafontaine & Kaufmann, 1994; Lillis et al., 1976) to test Hypothesis H6. 
For non-franchised firms, a firm’s actual age was used to test H6. 
Risk sharing variables. Previous studies have used different ways to measure 
risk. Martin (1998) and Norton (1988) used variance of sales over time to measure risk to 
test whether the franchiser relies on franchising to reduce risk. On the other hand, Roh 
(2002) and Hanson (1992) used variance in operating cash flows to measure risk, arguing 
that lower business risk is likely associated with a higher proportion of franchised units. 
In this study, variance in operating cash flows was used to measure risk and to test 
Hypothesis H7. 
Specific knowledge variable. A dummy variable, with 1 for quick-service 
restaurants and 0 for other types of restaurants, was used in this study to test Hypothesis 
8. As previously discussed, quick-service restaurants tend to require less specific 
knowledge than other types of restaurants. When specific knowledge required for the 
operation is high, firms should be less likely to franchise. Thus, the expected sign of the 
coefficient for the dummy variable is positive. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the variables selected for in this study to examine a firm’s 
decision to enter franchise agreements. These variables were used in both the univariate 
tests and logit regression analysis. 
Univariate tests 
The univariate test was used to test the eight variables. Univariate tests involve 
comparing the mean value of (1) number of states (State), (2) Number of total units 
(SIZE), (3) number of countries (Foreign), (4) percentage change in number of units 
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(Growth), (5) debt ratio (Debt), (6) age (Age), (7) variance in operating cash flow (Risk), 
and (8) quick dummy (Quick). 
To test the null hypotheses in the univariate tests, the mean value of each related variable 
was used as the appropriate test statistic to determine significant differences between 
firms engaged in franchising and those that are not. In order to perform the univariate 
test, variable group means and net differences were calculated by subtracting franchised 
firm means from the means of non-franchised companies. Failure to reject the null 
hypothesis would indicate that there is no significant difference in the mean values of the 
variables. On the other hand, rejection of the null hypothesis would offer support for the 
alternative hypothesis, indicating a significant difference between the mean values. 
 
Table 3.1 Description of Variables of Univariate Test 
   Hypothesis      Variables           Description 
 Franchising 1, if a firm is franchised; 0, otherwise 
H1 States Number of states a firm has operations 
H2 Size Number of total units 
H3 Foreign Number of countries a firm has operations 
H4 Growth Increase in number of units per year 
H5 Debt Total debt / Total equity 
H6 Age Age of the company started its 1st franchise unit 
H7 Risk Variance in operating cash flow 
H8 Quick  1, if a firm is quick service restaurant; 0, otherwise 
 
Logit model 
To test the prediction of a firm’s decision to franchise requires assessing the 
explanatory power of a single variable while holding constant the explanatory power of 
other independent variables. In this case, a multivariate regression approach is 
appropriate. Because the dependent variable is a dummy variable with 1 for the 
franchised firms and 0 for non-franchised firms, discriminant analysis and logit 
regression are both appropriate methodologies for solving classification problems 
involving two or more attributes (Hair et al., 1998). However, when the dependent 
variable has only two groups, logit regression may be preferred because discriminant 
analysis relies on strictly meeting the assumptions of multivariate normality and equal 
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variance-covariance matrices across groups. In contrast, logit regression does not face 
these strict assumptions and is more robust when these assumptions are not met (Hair et 
al., 1998). Logit models assure that the estimated probabilities lie in the range 0 to 1 by 
transforming the independent variables into a probability measure ranging from 0 to 1 
(Hair et al., 1998).  
In this study, multiple logit models were constructed and compared to identify a 
single model that is most able to discriminate between the characteristics of franchised 
and non-franchised firms. Logit estimation allows a comparison of the relative 
importance of the explanatory variables by defining the differences between the two 
groups. In addition, logit models allow analysis of the impact of a series of explanatory 
variables on the probability that firms will franchise. 
In the logit model, a linear function of the explanatory variables is set equal to the 
logarithm of the ratio of the probability of engaging in franchise contracts and of not 
engaging in franchise contracts. With the logit analysis, the independent variables are 
transformed into a probability measure varying from 0 to 1 with the parameter estimates. 
This represents the amount that the independent variables increase or decrease with the 
probability of franchising or not franchising. 
The logit regression model can be written as the follows: 
 Log [P(y) / ((1-P(y)))]=  β0 + β1X1 + β2X2+ … βkXk              (1) 
where P(y) = probability of franchising in the ith firm, 
 β0 = an intercept, 
 Xi = the explanatory variables i; i = 1 - k; k is the number of variables, and  
 Βi = coefficients of the ith explanatory variable. 
From the logit model, the estimated value of the dependent variable can be 
interpreted as the predicted probability of an event happening, which lies between 0 and 1 
(Hair et al., 1998). In this study, the estimated value of the dichotomous dependent 
variable was interpreted as the predicted probability of franchise or P(y). By solving P(y) 
from Equation 1, the predicted probability of franchise is described as  
            P(y) = еy / (1 + ey)       (2) 
where e = the base of the natural logarithm, and y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2+ … βkXk.      
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In this study, еy / (1 + ey) represents the odds ratio in favor of undertaking the 
franchise contract. To classify sample firms into a franchised group and a non-franchised 
group, the logit (y) value of each sample firm was calculated based on the estimated 
model and then applied to the probability function, P(y) = еy / (1 + ey). The specified 
models describe the effects of explanatory variables on the categorical response variable.  
 
Financial Performance Model 
Operationalization of financial performance variables  
Dependent variables 
As discussed in preceding chapter, there are several methods for measuring 
financial performance, and each valuation method has its own strengths and weaknesses. 
In this study, ROA, ROE, market-to-book ratio, and Tobin’s Q ratio were used to 
measure financial performance. The market-to-book ratio was calculated by dividing 
price per share by book value per share, dividing total owner’s equity by the number of 
shares outstanding. A firm creates value when the market-to-book ratio is more than 1.0, 
destroys value when market-to-book value is less than 1.0, and sustains value if the 
market-to-book ratio is 1.0 (Varaiya et al., 1987). Another measure of the value of a firm 
is Tobin’s Q ratio, which plays an important role in many financial interactions (Chung & 
Puritt, 1994). Tobin’s Q was developed by economist James Tobin as a predictor of a 
firm’s future investments (Tobin 1969) Tobin’s Q ratio is the ratio of the market value of 
the firm to the replacement cost of its tangible assets, such as property, plant, equipment, 
inventory, cash, and investment in securities (Tobin, 1969; Simon & Sullivan, 1993). 
This ratio has been used to explain a variety of corporate phenomena. For example, it has 
been used as a measure of returns from diversification (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Wernerfelt 
& Montgomery, 1988), as a measure of brand equity (Simon & Sullivan, 1993), and as an 
indicator of a firm’s intangible value (Hirschey, 1982).  
In spite of its influence in many important aspects of corporate finance, the actual 
applications of Tobin’s Q ratio in practice have been limited because of the difficulty of 
acquiring all the information necessary to calculate it.  Chung and Pruitt (1994) 
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introduced an accurate approximation of Q using commonly available variables in the 
COMPUSTAT database. This approximation of the q ratio explained 96.6% of the 
variability in Tobin’s Q (Chung & Pruitt, 1994), and many practitioners and researchers 
have adopted it (Bharadwaj et al., 1999; Rao et al., 2004). Approximate Q is defined in 
the following formula: 
Approximate Q = (MVE + PS + DEBT) / TA         (3) 
where MVE = (share price) x (number of common stock outstanding), 
 PS = Liquidating value of the firm’s preferred stock, 
DEBT = (short-term liabilities – short-term assets) + (book value of long-term 
debt), and  
TA = book value of total assets. 
Because a firm’s Q value is the ratio of its market value to the current 
replacement cost of its assets (Tobin, 1969), a Q value of 1 means that the market value 
of a firm is equal to the replacement cost of its tangible assets. Such firms have no 
intangible assets, such as intellectual property rights (patents, trademarks) and other 
capabilities and resources that differentiate them, reduce their costs, and provide 
competitive advantages. A Q-value more than 1.0 reflects a firm that has unmeasured 
sources of value: intangible assets. Generally, these intangible assets enable a firm to 
develop competitive advantages, create earnings and cash flows in excess of the return on 
its tangible assets, and achieve an abnormal return on invested capital relative to its 
competitors (Srivastava et al., 1998; Kerin & Sethuraman 1998). In other words, firms 
with intangible assets (Q ratios more than 1) have more potential for creating wealth for 
their shareholders than do firms without intangible assets (Kerin & Sethuraman, 1998).  
The other method used in this study to indicate financial performance is 
accounting return: ROA and ROE. ROA was computed by dividing net income by 
average total assets. ROE was computed by dividing net income by average stockholder 
equity.  
 Independent Variables 
The independent variable of interest is the proportion of franchised outlets. The 
proportion of franchised outlets was defined as the ratio of franchised to total number of 
outlets. A firm is wholly company owned when the proportion of franchised outlets value 
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is 0, fully franchised when the proportion of franchised outlets value is 1, and have both 
franchised and company owned units if the proportion of franchised owned outlets value 
lies between 1 and 0. 
To estimate the net effects of a firm’s franchising strategy on its ROA, ROE, 
market-to-book ratio, and Tobin’s Q, several variables, identified in previous studies as 
having a significant relationship with firms’ value, were controlled.  The following 
summarizes the literature review for those variables. 
(1) Advertising  
Advertising can increase the value of an organization’s intangible assets, such as 
its level of brand equity (Jones, 1995). Advertising can affect brand equity through brand 
associations, perceived quality, and user experience (Simon & Sullivan, 1993), which in 
turn generates financial value through enhanced cash flow attributable to customer 
loyalty, brand extensions, and higher profit margins ( Singh et al., 2005). Advertising is 
effective in creating awareness, enhancing consumer knowledge, and influencing both 
short- and long-term consumer preferences, as well as generating additional revenue 
(Abdel-Khalik, 1975; Hirschey, 1982). Furthermore, advertising expenditures have a 
positive relationship with a firm’s intangible assets (Chauvin & Hirschey, 1993; Rao et 
al., 2004; Simon & Sullivan, 1993).  Moreover, Joshi and Hanessens (2004) have 
indicated that advertising has a positive and long-term influence on a firm’s market value. 
Given these studies, a positive relationship between advertising and Tobin’s Q and a 
positive relationship between advertising and market-to-book value were expected.  
(2) Profitability 
According to Hirschey (1982), current profit rate is an important and highly 
significant determinant of the market value of a firm. In general, a higher operating 
margin triggers expectations among investors of higher cash flow potential and drives 
intangible value. Many studies have used Tobin’s Q to explain a number of diverse 
corporate phenomena and have found that Tobin’s Q is positively affected by the firm’s 
profitability (Bharadwaj et al., 1999; Rao et al., 2004). For example, in a study of brand 
strategy and the intangible value of a firm, Rao et al., (2004) reported that Tobin’s Q 
correlates significantly and positively with the firm’s operating margin. Therefore, we 
expected profitability to have a positive impact on Tobin’s Q and market-to-book value. 
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In this study, I used net income divided by average book value of total assets (ROA) to 
measure a firm’s profitability.  
(3) Financial leverage 
According to Miller and Modigliani (1961), leverage should not affect firm value. 
However, firms with higher leverage can enjoy tax shelters because they can deduct 
interest costs, resulting in better cash flow. Thus Tobin’s Q should increase as leverage 
increases (Habib & Ljungqvist, 2005; McConnell & Servaes, 1990). On the other hand, 
increasing leverage also results in additional costs. As leverage increases, bankruptcy 
costs rise. Accordingly, Tobin’s Q should decrease as leverage increases. Moreover, 
many studies have shown that firms with more growth opportunities are likely to have 
less leverage and higher Q values (Habib & Ljungqvist, 2005; Smith & Watts, 1992). 
Many empirical studies have found that leverage has a negative impact on Tobin’s Q 
(Rao et al., 2004; Smith & Watts, 1992), so this study also expected a negative impact of 
leverage on both Tobin’s Q and market-to-book ratio. Financial leverage was measured 
as the total debt to total assets. 
(4) Firm size 
The size of a firm affects its performance in many ways. Key features of a large 
firm are its diverse capabilities, the abilities to exploit economies of scale, and scope. 
These characteristics, by making operations more effective, allow larger firms to perform 
better than small firms (Ben-Zio & Shalit, 1975). Chauvin and Hirschey (1993) also 
argued that economies of scale enable large firms to enjoy advantages in cost of sales, 
labor cost, and advertising and promotion costs. Consequently, large firms produce 
higher profit, increasing their market value. Gu (1999) analyzed the financial 
performance of small and large casinos, finding that larger casinos had higher returns on 
investment and better return on assets ratios than small casinos. Upneja, Kim and Singh 
(2000) also found that larger casinos are more profitable than small casinos. In order to 
measure the relationship between a firm’s franchising strategy and its financial 
performance, this study controlled the potential effects of firm size on Tobin’s Q, market-
to-book ratio, ROA, and ROE.   Total number of units was used as measures of firm size 
in this study. 
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Table 3.2 provides a brief summary of the variables selected in this study to assessing a 
firm’s financial performance. These variables were used in the multivariate regression 
analysis.  
 
Table 3.2 Measurement of Financial Variables 
Variable Description 
ROA Net income/Average total assets 
ROE Net income/Average stockholders’ equity 
Market-to-book ratio Price per share/Book value per share 
Tobin’s Q (MVE + PS + DEBT) / TA 
Growth The number of units change per year  
Financial Leverage Total debt / Total equity 
Advertising Ratio Advertising expenditure/Total assets 
Firm Size Total number of units 
Proportion of franchise outlets Franchised outlets/Total outlets 
 
. 
Statistical models: Financial performance 
To test hypotheses H10, this study used t-tests to examine the mean differences of 
franchised and non-franchised firms’ ROA, ROE, market-to-book ratio, and Tobin’s Q 
ratio. To test the financial performance difference between franchised and non-franchised 
firms, the variable group means and net differences were calculated by subtracting 
franchised firm means from the means of non-franchised companies. Failure to reject the 
null hypothesis would indicate that there is no significant difference in the mean values of 
the variables. On the other hand, rejection of the null hypothesis would offer support for 
the alternative hypothesis, indicating a significant difference between the mean values. 
To test hypotheses H10 to H11, multiple multivariate regression models were 
used.  The following regressions were conducted:  
ROA = β0 + β1Size + β2 Financial leverage + β3 Proportion of franchise units + β4 
(Proportion of franchise units)2 + ε                      (7)  
 
ROE = β0+ β1 Size + β2 Financial leverage + β3 Proportion of franchise units + β4 
(Proportion of franchise units)2  + ε                           (8) 
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 Market-to-book ratio = β0 + β1 Size + β2 ROA+ β3 Financial leverage + β4 Advertising + 
β5 Proportion of franchise units + β6 (Proportion of franchise units)2  + β7 
(Advertising x Proportion of franchise units) + ε         (9) 
 
Tobin’s Q =   β0 + β1 Size + β2 ROA + β3 Financial leverage + β4 Advertising + β5 
Proportion of franchise units + β6 (Proportion of franchise units)2  + β7 
(Advertising x Proportion of franchise units) +  ε              (10)  
 
Equation 7 was used to examine the relationships between proportion of franchise 
units and ROA, while controlling for firm size. Similar to Equation 7, Equation 8 was 
used to examine the relationships between proportion of franchise units and ROE, while 
controlling for firm size. Equation 9 was used to examine the relationship between 
proportion of franchised units and market-to-book ratio, and the moderator effects of 
proportion of franchise units on the relationship between advertising and market-to-book 
value, while controlling for other firm specific variables (profitability, financial leverage, 
and firm size). Like Equation 9, Equation 10 was used to estimate the relationship 
between proportion of franchised units and Tobin’s Q, and the moderating effect of the 
proportion of franchised units on the relationship between advertising and Tobin’s Q, 
while controlling for other firm specific variables (profitability, financial leverage, and 
firm size).   
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Figure 2 Effect of Franchising on Financial Performance 
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CHAPTER 4 - DETERMINANTS OF THE FRANCHISE 
DECISION  
Abstract 
Franchising captures a sizeable portion of the restaurant industry and plays an 
important role in its success. Despite the importance of franchising to the restaurant 
industry, little has been done to study why restaurant firms initiate franchising. This study 
attempted to explain what influences the choice of organizational form of restaurant 
firms.  A logistic regression model was developed to identify a set of variables that best 
differentiates firms engaged in franchise contracts from those that are not. The results 
indicated that 1) resource scarcity influenced restaurant firms’ initial franchising 
decisions, 2) the degree of geographic dispersion and involvement in foreign countries 
increased the probability of a firm’s initial decision to franchise, and 3) the decrease of 
specific knowledge requirements increased the probability of a firm’s initial decision to 
franchise. Based on the statistical results, several suggestions are made that should help 
restaurant firms decide whether franchising is an appropriate choice for their operations. 
 
KEYWORDS: Franchising, agency theory, resource scarcity, risk-sharing, specific 
knowledge, and restaurant. 
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Introduction 
In the last few decades, franchising has become a part of every day life in the 
United States. Many firms in a variety of industries have adopted franchising as a method 
of doing business. In 2001, PricewaterhouseCoopers estimated that there were more than 
767,000 businesses in the franchise system in the United States (U.S.), directly providing 
more than 9 million jobs, more than $229 billion in payroll, and more than $624 billion of 
output (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004). In general, two major environmental factors 
have contributed to the development of franchising. First, the change in lifestyles in the 
United States and Western Europe has emphasized service and convenience (Justis & 
Judd, 1998). Second, more travel, which has enhanced the value of a brand name, also 
contributes to the expansion of franchising (Mathewson & Winter, 1985).  
In the restaurant industry, franchising also plays an important role in the growth 
of the industry. According to PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004), more than 56% of fast-
service restaurants and 13% of full-service restaurants are franchises. Consumer mobility 
and time constraints have increased the popularity of restaurant chains. Consumers are 
likely to select restaurants with national brand names over local restaurants to avoid 
losing time searching for restaurants in unfamiliar locations (Mathewson & Winter, 1985; 
Sen, 1998). As a result, many restaurant chains have chosen franchising as the preferred 
method of expansion (Sen, 1998).  
Despite the popularity of franchising among restaurant firms, however, existing 
research has not fully studied what influences the decision to franchise in the restaurant 
industry. For instance, franchising offers a firm the benefits of vertical control over retail 
units without the investment in assets required by a fully company-owned chain. 
Nevertheless, many chains still choose to own all units instead of franchising (e.g., 
Cheesecake Factory, Inc. and P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc.). The debate continues 
among researchers about why firms make such organizational choices. In particular, are 
there any firm-specific factors that affect the choice of organizational form? What 
existing theories can be applied to explain a firm’s franchise decision?  
While previous studies (Brickely & Dark, 1987; Carney & Gedajlovic 1991; 
Combs & Ketchen, 1999; Norton, 1988; Sen, 1998) attempted to address these questions, 
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they all used variations in the proportion of company-owned outlets among franchised 
companies to study the franchise decision. The data from non-franchisers were not 
included, and the question of why firms choose not to franchise was therefore not 
addressed. In other words, including firm-level data from both franchisers and non-
franchisers is necessary to examine the “initiating” decision (Combs et al., 2004). 
The purposes of this study were 1) to review the legitimacy of applying several 
existing theories, including agency theory, resource scarcity theory, risk-sharing theory, 
and specific knowledge theory, to investigate the factors that affect the franchising 
decision in the restaurant sector and 2) to provide information to assist restaurant 
managers in deciding whether franchising is an appropriate choice for their company.  
 
Theoretical Foundation and Research Hypotheses 
Agency theory 
 
A number of studies have explained the existence of franchising through agency 
theory (Brickly & Dark, 1987; Lafontaine, 1992). According to agency theory, managers 
(the agents) tend to shirk their duties when their compensation is fixed. As a result, the 
firm will incur higher monitoring costs to ensure that managers act in the firm’s best 
interests. In the case of a franchise agreement, the franchisee purchases the right to profit 
from a particular unit by paying franchise fees and royalties to the franchiser. Franchisees 
are the owner-managers and bear the residual of risk of a local operation. Since owner-
managers of franchised units are compensated by residual claims from their particular 
units and they put their own capital at risk, they are usually more motivated to run 
effective operations in order to maximize the present value of the franchise unit (Shane, 
1996). Because franchising aligns the franchiser and the franchisee’s interests, the need 
for monitoring is reduced (Rubin, 1978).  
Agency theory has received support from many empirical studies. For example, 
Dark and Brickley (1987) found that the cost of monitoring store managers seems to be 
the most important factor in making franchise decisions. They suggested franchising is 
more efficient than using company-owned outlets when it is difficult for the firms to 
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monitor the behavior of individual outlets and when environmental uncertainty exists. 
Brickely, Dark, and Weisbach (1992) found the likelihood of franchising decreases as 
monitoring costs go down. Based on a study of publicly traded restaurant chains between 
1992 and 1995, Combs and Ketchen (1999) concluded that firms with high outlet-level 
asset specificity, low specific knowledge, and high geographic dispersion used 
franchising significantly more than other firms. Lafontaine (1992) also suggested 
geographic dispersion and the increasing importance of the franchisee’s input also 
increase franchisers’ propensity to franchise, thus supporting the agency theory. 
The literature seems to agree that great geographic dispersion increases 
monitoring costs under company ownership and thereby encourages franchising. As a 
firm enters geographic markets far removed from headquarters, the costs of monitoring 
outlet managers increase because of the need for more monitoring personnel and travel 
related expenses (Carney & Gedajlovic, 1991). Thus, companies that operate over a 
wider geographic area face more challenges in monitoring their outlets and controlling 
their operations and should prefer to franchise rather than own units in their system 
(Combs & Castrogiovanni, 1994; Norton, 1998). Accordingly, this study proposes the 
following hypothesis based on agency theory: 
H1: Franchised firms in the restaurant industry are more geographically dispersed 
than non-franchised firms. 
 
Another important variable considered in agency theory is system size. Many 
studies note that system size relates positively to the franchising decision (Combs & 
Ketchen, 2003). According to the agency theory, firms use franchising to minimize 
monitoring costs as they expand into new and distant markets. As firms grow, the 
entrepreneurs must hire employees to undertake activities that the entrepreneurs 
themselves could not. Hiring new employees may increase adverse selection and moral 
hazard. Agency theory suggests that the more units in the system, the harder it is to 
monitor and control units, and the more likely firms will engage in franchising (Shane, 
1996; Combs & Ketchen, 2003; Alon, 2001). In view of that, this study proposes the 
following hypothesis: 
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H2:  Franchised restaurant have more outlets than non-franchised restaurant firms. 
 
The other commonly-cited factor in the increasing cost of monitoring is foreign 
expansion. In international operations, distance and time increase the level of uncertainty 
attributable to the information gap. It is very difficult and costly to gather and receive 
information about foreign operations in a timely manner. Moreover, cultural differences 
may increase the cost of gathering information (Fladmoe-Lindquist & Jacque, 1995). 
Using the percentage of total growth achieved through franchising that occurred in 91 
restaurant chains between 1991 and 1993, Hoover et al. (2003) found foreign expansion 
increased the propensity to franchise. Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque (1995) also 
suggested that more geographic distance involved in monitoring foreign agents and more 
cultural distance could lead to more franchise arrangements. Accordingly, this study 
proposes the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: Franchised restaurants in the restaurant industry are more likely to become 
involved in foreign expansion than non-franchised restaurant firms. 
 
 
Resource scarcity theory 
 
Another explanation for franchising is resource scarcity theory. According to 
resource scarcity theory, franchising is designed to provide franchisers with the resources 
necessary to accelerate growth to reach minimum efficient scale and build brand name 
capital (Hunt, 1973; Norton, 1995; Oxenfeldt & Thompson, 1968). In particular, 
franchising can ease the financial constraints of growth and expansion in small- to 
medium-sized firms (Caves & Murphy, 1976; Oxenfeldt & Thompson, 1968). Unlike a 
company-owned outlet, a franchised store is operated by a franchisee, an independent 
legal entity. Franchisees provide cash to the franchiser in the form of franchise fees and 
royalties, and provide investment in the outlet through the purchase of fixed assets 
(Lafontaine & Kaufmann, 1994). Franchising not only relieves the franchiser of the need 
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to raise cash for growth, but can also conserve capital and more quickly establish a 
distribution channel (Mcquire & Staelin, 1983). In addition to providing capital to 
franchisers, franchisees also offer managerial talent and local knowledge to fuel franchise 
growth (Minkler, 1992; Norton, 1988; Shane, 1996). According to Shane (1996), the 
franchise contract requires that franchisees profit primarily from residual income at 
individual outlets. Franchisees invest a significant amount of money and time into their 
units; thus, they are likely to purchase a franchise only if they have confidence in their 
own managerial abilities. Thus, franchising may screen out applicants who lack the 
necessary managerial skills (Norton, 1988). In other words, franchising can help 
franchisers attract the requisite human capital for growth in a relative short time. 
Franchising also allows a firm to leverage its franchisees’ local market knowledge as a 
firm expands into new geographic areas (Minkler, 1992).  
Several empirical studies have supported resource scarcity theory in explaining 
franchise decisions in the restaurant industry. For instance, Sen (1998) investigated the 
use of franchising as a growth strategy in the US restaurant industry and found a close 
relationship between the use of franchising and outlet growth within the restaurant 
industry.  His results also show larger chains used less franchising in their expansion 
strategies. By surveying franchisers, Dant (1995) revealed that capital scarcity influenced 
the initial decision to use franchising, supporting the leverage of franchising to overcome 
resource constraints argument. Combs and Ketchen (1999) studied 91 publicly traded 
restaurant chains, revealing that companies with capital constraints were more likely to 
use franchising for expansion. More recently, Alon (2001) also argued that firms with 
fewer resources rely more on franchising. 
In summary, according to resource scarcity theory, franchising allows the 
franchised firm to use franchisee managerial and financial resources to achieve rapid 
growth (Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969). Franchising also reduces 
the time and effort required to identify and train new managers, which is frequently a 
major constraint to growth (Penrose, 1959). Many studies have found that franchising 
reduces franchisers’ time and effort in selecting outlet managers and increases 
franchisers’ growth (Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; Shane, 1996; Thompson, 1994).  Dant 
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(1995) concluded that entrepreneurs perceive the opportunity for rapid growth as an 
important reason to franchise. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H4: Franchised restaurant firms have higher growth rates than non-franchised 
restaurant firms. 
Resource scarcity theory supports the idea that franchising is a relatively 
inexpensive way to expand operations, by increasing revenue through franchise fees, 
royalties, and sales to franchisees, and by substituting franchisee investment in local 
operations for parent company investment in local operations. Hunt (1973) stated that 
firms choose to franchise units because they simply do not have access to the capital 
required to expand via company-owned units. Subsequently, Norton (1995) argued that 
the costs of debt should be higher and the debt/equity ratios should be lower for 
franchised companies. More growth opportunities, more advertising, more intangible 
capital, and asymmetric information could generate higher costs of both debt and equity, 
and franchising is common where growth opportunities, advertising, intangible capital, 
and asymmetric information are substantial.  Using a sample of 25 franchisers and a 
companion group of 25 non-franchisers, Norton (1995) found that non-franchisers have 
higher debt-to-equity ratios than franchisers, showing the relevance of capital structure in 
situations where franchising is common. Accordingly, the following hypothesis is 
proposed: 
H5: Franchised restaurant firms have lower debt- to-equity ratios than non-franchised 
restaurant firms. 
The resource scarcity theory also suggests that franchising varies over an 
organization’s life cycle (Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969). Young, small, growing, and less-
liquid firms use franchising to increase the flow of scarce resources (Alon, 2001; 
Anderson, 1984; Carney & Gedajovic, 1991; Combs & Ketchen, 1999; Hunt, 1973; 
Martin & Justis, 1993; Shane, 1996). In contrast, larger and older firms with liquid capital 
have fewer franchised units. If resource scarcity is a major reason for franchising, we 
should find that franchised firms started franchising in the very early stages to overcome 
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capital and managerial resource constraints. Thus, based on the resource scarcity theory, 
this study proposes the following hypothesis: 
H6: Franchised restaurant firms are younger when they started franchising than non-
franchised restaurant firms.  
 
Risk- sharing theory 
 
The third popular theory to justify the franchising decision is risk-sharing theory.  
Previous research has suggested that franchise contracts arise principally from the need to 
share risks (Lafontaine & Bhattacharyya, 1995). That is, franchising allows franchisers 
and franchisees to share the risk of the future success of the franchised units.  
According to risk-sharing theory, franchising allows franchisers to maintain 
control over profitable units with more predictable revenue while shedding relative risky 
locations with uncertain revenues (Combs & Castrogiovanni, 1994). Much research has 
provided empirical support for risk sharing by revealing that franchised units are 
frequently located in remote locations with lower sales per unit than company-owned 
units (Brickley & Dark, 1987; Martin, 1988). For example, using data obtained from 
Franchise Annual and the Source Book of Franchise Opportunities, Martin (1988) found 
that franchisers tend to own or buy back the more profitable and less risky outlets and to 
franchise the less profitable and more risky outlets.  
 In addition, franchising can reduce the volatility of franchisers’ cash flow and 
risk. The cash flow from franchising is derived from sales-based royalties. Since sales 
revenue is never below zero, a sharing arrangement can reduce the franchiser’s business 
risk, because the income stream is not significantly affected by any cost inefficiencies on 
the part of the franchisee (Caves and Murphy, 1976). For example, as Robert Nugent, 
CEO of Jack in the Box, noted “The economic advantage to franchising is that there is 
less risk to our income statement because we’re not affected by the cost pressures” 
(Bradach, 1998, p. 68). On the other hand, a company-owned unit requires fixed capital 
investment, which increases the firm’s operating leverage and risk. Overall, franchises 
provide firms with lower risk and low-cost access to markets that are not economically 
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worthwhile for them to pursue through vertically integrated channels (Dahlstrom & 
Nygaard, 1994).   
The risk-sharing argument has been supported in several studies. Using sector 
data from the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Franchising in the Economy, Lafontaine 
(1992) found that risk increases the use of franchising and decreases the franchiser’s 
share. Roh (2002) used the 3-year variance of operating cash flows to measure risk. He 
also found that the propensity to franchise units reduces risk, supporting the risk-sharing 
argument. In summary, the investment of capital and manpower by franchisees in their 
outlets means that franchising requires less financial investment by franchisers and 
involves less capital risk than a company-owned network. Based on the risk-sharing 
argument, this study proposes the following hypothesis: 
H7: Franchised restaurant firms are less risky than non-franchised restaurant firms 
 
Specific knowledge theory 
 
The literature also suggests the transfer of specific knowledge between the 
principal and agent is another factor that might affect the franchise decision.  Specific 
knowledge refers to the knowledge required to efficiently handle operations, improve 
efficiency, and promote products and services (Combs & Ketchen, 1999; Hoover et al., 
2003). According to the specific knowledge explanation, the franchise appears to work 
best where operations are relatively simple and repetitive. In the service sector, 
homogeneity is a problem, so a company should be less inclined to use franchising when 
specific knowledge required in the job is high (Hoover et al., 2003). Michael (1996) also 
suggests that franchising does not fully utilize the franchisee’s human capital. To use 
human capital to its fullest, the local operator and franchisee should make all decisions 
individually, forfeiting gains from standardization and scale. By contrast, the 
standardized product delivered by the franchise system requires that the franchiser make 
decisions such as marketing and product design centrally, without using the franchisee’s 
human capital. Thus, industries that do not benefit from standardization will not 
franchise. Thus, the more important human capital is to production, the less likely the 
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company is to franchise. Watson, Kirby, and Egan (2002) found industries with high 
levels of franchise operations tend to have lower average earnings, suggesting lower 
human capital requirement. Hoover et al. (2003) suggested that as specific knowledge 
decreases, franchising increases.   
The relationship between specific knowledge and franchise decisions has 
important implications for the format of quick-service restaurants. The common attributes 
of restaurant products and services are intangibility and heterogeneity. Intangibility 
creates a greater perceived risk for customers, who must rely on the promise of 
satisfaction without the opportunity to return the purchase, while heterogeneity implies a 
lack of uniformity of the service. In this regard, the challenge for restaurant firms is to 
maintain control of quality and standards, keeping both aspects consistent throughout the 
entire organization.  Among various types of restaurants, the specific knowledge required 
by quick service restaurants is less intensive because of their limited menus and minimal 
customer service. Many quick service restaurant chains adopt a production line approach 
(e.g., McDonalds, Wendy’s, Burger King) to simplify their production and reduce service 
variability (Bowen & Lawler, 1992; Power, 1992). By doing so, fast food service is, in 
many ways, like a manufacturing system rather than a traditional restaurant. Accordingly, 
this study proposes the following hypothesis: 
H8: Quick service restaurants are more likely to be franchised than other types of 
restaurants.  
 
 
Methodology 
Sample selection and sources of data 
The sample for this study was chosen from a list of 100 publicly traded restaurant 
firms in the Standard & Poor’s Compustat database, based on their 4-digit Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code of 5812, for the years 1996 through 2005. Next, firms 
with fewer than four outlets that did not constitute a chain ((Hawes & Crittenden, 1984; 
Combs & Ketchen, 1997), or were franchisees of chains, such as a Burger King or 
 60
Wendy’s franchisee, were excluded from the sample. Among the initial set of 100 firms, 
18 firms were dropped from the sample. As a result, our analyses cover 82 firms, 
observed for 721 firm-years. Most of firms provide 10 years information, but some firms 
enter or exit the sample between 1996 and 2005 and contribute fewer firm-years of data. 
Financial data was obtained from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database. The number of 
franchised units and total units, the number of states, and foreign operations were 
collected from Bond’s Franchise Guide and annual 10 K filings of each firm in the SEC’s 
Edgar database.  
Classifying Variables 
Dependent variable. The primary objective of this study was to identify what 
motivates a company to pursue franchise contracts rather than keeping all restaurants 
wholly company-owned. Thus, firms could be classified into two mutually exclusive 
categories, franchise or non-franchise. The dependent variable, franchising, in this study 
is discrete in nature and involves a situation in which one alternative or the other must be 
chosen. Statistically, franchising is a dummy variable with 1 for the franchised firms and 
0 for non-franchised firms. 
Agency theory variables. The number of states in which the firm has operations 
was used as proxy variable for the geographic dispersion (Combs & Ketchen, 1999; 
Lafontaine, 1992; Carney & Gedajlovic, 1991) to test hypothesis H1. The number of 
units of the firm was used as a proxy variable to measure size to test hypothesis H2, and 
the number of countries in which the firm has operations was used to test hypothesis H3. 
Resource scarcity theory variables. The change in the number of units per year 
was used as a proxy variable for growth to test Hypothesis H4. The total debt-to-equity 
ratio was used to test Hypothesis H5.  For franchised companies, the year the company 
started its first franchise was used to measure age and was used as a surrogate for the 
degree of system maturity and thus as a measure of a franchisor’s access to resources 
(Lafontaine & Kaufmann, 1994; Lillis et al., 1976) to test Hypothesis H6. For non-
franchised firms, a firm’s actual age was used to test H6.  
Risk sharing variables.  Previous studies have measured risk differently. Martin 
(1998) and Norton (1998) used variance of sales over time to measure risk to test whether 
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the franchiser relies on franchising to reduce risk. On the other hand, Roh (2002) and 
Hanson (1992) used variance in operating cash flows to measure risk, arguing that lower 
business risk is likely associated with a higher proportion of franchised units. In this 
study, variance in operating cash flows was used to measure risk and to test Hypothesis 
H7. 
Specific knowledge variable. A dummy variable, with 1 for quick service 
restaurants and 0 for other types of restaurants, was used in this study to test Hypothesis 
8. Quick service restaurants tend to require less specific knowledge than other types of 
restaurants, because quick service restaurants usually offer limited menus and minimal 
customer service (Power, 1992). When specific knowledge required for the operation is 
high, firms should be less likely to franchise. Thus, the expected sign of the coefficient 
for the dummy variable is positive. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the variables chosen in this study to examine a firm’s 
decision to enter franchise agreements. These variables were used in both the univariate 
tests and logit regression analysis. 
 
Table 4.1 Variables Relate to a Firm’s Decision to Enter a Franchise Agreement 
Hypotheses Variables Description 
 Franchising (dummy) 1, if a firm is franchised; 0, otherwise 
H1 State Number of states a firm has operations 
H2 Size Number of total units 
H3 Foreign Number of countries a firm has operations 
H4 Growth Increase in number of units per year 
H5 Debt ratio Total debt / Total equity 
H6 Age Age of the company started its 1st franchise unit 
H7 Risk Variance in operating cash flow 
H8 Quick (dummy) 1, if a firm is quick service restaurant; 0, otherwise 
 
Statistical Analysis 
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The logit regression method was conducted to estimate a logit model with 
significant determinants that predict the probability that a firm will decide to franchise.  
Logit estimation allows the relative importance of the explanatory variables to be 
compared by defining the differences between the two groups. In addition, logit models 
allow analysis of the impact of a series of explanatory variables on the probability that 
firm uses franchising. 
In the logit model, a linear function of the explanatory variables was set equal to 
the logarithm of the ratio of the probability of engaging in franchise contracts and of not 
engaging in franchise contracts. With the logit analysis, the independent variables were 
transformed into a probability measure varying from 0 to 1 with the parameter estimates. 
This represented the amount that the independent variables increase or decrease with the 
probability of franchising or not franchising. 
The logit regression model can be written as the follows: 
Log [P(y) / ((1-P(y)))]=  β0 + β1X1 + β2X2+ … βkXk              (1) 
where P(y) = probability of franchising in the ith firm, 
 β0 = an intercept, 
 Xi = the explanatory variables i; i = 1 - k; k is the number of variables, and  
 Βi = coefficients of the ith explanatory variable. 
From the logit model, the estimated value of the dependent variable can be 
interpreted as the predicted probability of an event happening, which lies between 0 and 1 
(Hair et al., 1998). In this study, the estimated value of the dichotomous dependent 
variable was interpreted as the predicted probability of franchise or P(y). By solving P(y) 
from Equation 1, the predicted probability of franchise is described as  
P(y) = еy / (1 + ey)       (2) 
where e = the base of the natural logarithm, and y = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2+ … βkXk.      
In this study, еy / (1 + ey) represents the odds ratio in favor of undertaking a 
franchise contract. To classify sample firms into a franchise group and a non-franchise 
group, the logit (y) value of each sample firm was calculated based on the estimated 
model and then applied to the probability function, P(y) = еy / (1 + ey). The specified 
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models describe the effects of explanatory variables on the categorical response variable. 
In this study, firms with P(y) value of more than 0.5 were classified into the franchised 
group, and firms with P(y) value equal to or less than 0.5 were classified into the non-
franchised groups. 
 
Table 4.2 Group Means and Differences between Franchised and Non-franchised 
Companies 
Variables Franchised Non-franchised Mean difference T-ratio 
States (number of 
states) 
28.89 14.84 14.05 12.776*** 
Size (units) 2368.79 153.06 2215.73 7.173*** 
Foreign (number of 
foreign countries) 
11.33 0.18 11.15 9.426*** 
Growth (units) 122.21 8.19 114.02 6.204*** 
Debt ratio 3.05 4.30 -1.25 -.957 
Age  8.10 23.82 -15.72 -15.707*** 
Risk 0.26 2.08 -1.82 -1.032 
Quick (dummy) 0.47 0.17 0.30 9.216*** 
Note:  ***p< .001  
 
Results 
 Table 4.2 presents the mean values of the 8 predicting variables for the franchise 
group and non-franchise group of the model estimation sample. T-test statistics and 
related p values of the two groups are also presented. The t tests show that at the p value 
< .001 significance level, the two groups are different in 6 variables – State, Size, 
Foreign, Growth, Age, and Knowledge.   
Comparing the two groups’ means for geographic dispersion (measured by 
number of states in which a firm has operations) shows that the franchised restaurant 
firms operated in more states than non-franchised restaurant firms. This result supports 
H1 and suggests that franchised firms are more geographically dispersed than non-
franchised firms. The mean value of total units is 2,369 units for franchised firms and 153 
units for non-franchised firms. This result supports H2 and shows that, on average, 
franchised firms are larger than non-franchised firms. The t test also suggests that 
franchised firms have operations in more foreign countries than non-franchised firms, 
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supporting H3.   These results support for agency theory predictions that franchising will 
be used in situation where monitoring costs are high, as with large geographical diverse 
firms. In terms of growth, the results show that, on average, franchised firms increased by 
122 units per year and non-franchised firms increased by 8 units per year.  The difference 
in growth variable is statistically significant at the p < .001 level. This result supports H4 
and supports the resource scarcity explanation for franchising.  The mean value of total 
debt to equity ratio was 3.05 for the franchised firms and 4.3 for non-franchised firms. 
However, the difference was not statistically significant. This result fails to support H5. 
Another variable used in this study as a proxy for resource scarcity is age. According to 
the theory of resource scarcity, young and growing firms should use franchising more to 
increase the flow of scarce resources. In this study, we used the year the franchiser started 
its first franchise unit to measure age and used the actual age to measure non-franchisers’ 
age. The results show that the average age for franchised companies to start their first 
franchise is 8 years and that the average age of non-franchised firms is around 24 years. 
This supports H6 and the resource explanation that young firms use franchising more to 
increase the flow of scarce resources.  
For the risk sharing explanation for franchising, the hypothesis predicts that the 
risk for franchised firms is lower than for non-franchised firms. From Table 4.2, the 
variation of operating cash flow is higher for franchised firms than non-franchised firms. 
However, the difference is insignificant. Thus, the results fail to support the risk sharing 
explanation for franchising, and H7 is not supported.  
We used a dummy variable to test specific knowledge theory for franchising. The 
mean value of the Quick variable for the franchised firms was higher than for non-
franchised firms. More than 47% of franchised firms were quick service restaurant 
chains, but only 17% of non-franchised firms were quick service restaurants. This result 
supports H8 and specific knowledge explanation for franchising.   
To test which variables have relatively more explanatory power to discriminate 
between firms engaged in franchise contract and those that are not, logit regressions were 
performed to find the best model. Before logit regression, the data was screened for 
multicollinearity. Logit regression, like other multiple regressions, is very sensitive to 
extremely high correlation among predictor variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). By 
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inspecting the correlation among predictor variables (Table 4.3), we found the correlation 
between Size and Foreign is 0.94. The high correlation between Size and Foreign could  
 
Table 4.3 Pearson’s Bivariate Correlations between Independent Variables 
 States Size Foreign Growth Debt Age Risk Knowledge 
States 1        
Size .41** 1       
Foreign  .48**    .94** 1      
Growth .33** .58** .59** 1     
Debt  .06** .15**  .12** -.04 1    
Age -.25** -.13** -.15** -.105** -.00 1   
Risk -.06 -.01 -.02 -.01 -.01 .01 1  
Quick .17** .31** .30** .28** .08* -.04 .03 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed). 
 
cause collinearity in logistic regression analysis. To confirm our concern, a preliminary 
regression was performed to investigate the tolerance levels of the independent variables: 
State, Size, Foreign, Growth, Debt Ratio, Age, Risk, and Knowledge.  The results (Table 
4.4) showed that the Size and Foreign variables have very low tolerance levels, 0.11 and 
0.1, and very high variance inflation factors (VIF), 8.92 and 9.76. The low tolerance 
levels and high VIFs of Size and Foreign confirmed that these two are redundant 
variables and that we needed to delete one of them from the model to reduce 
multicollinearity (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  
Two logit regression models were run, one including all the independent variables 
except Size in the model (Model A) and the other one including all the independent 
variables except Foreign in the model (Model B), to test which model is better in 
discriminating franchise firms from non-franchise firms.  With the significance level set 
at .05, the logit regression (model A) showed that among the seven independent 
variables, only four (Age, States, Foreign, and Quick) of the seven could best 
differentiate franchised restaurant firms from non-franchised restaurant firms. The logit 
estimated results are presented in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.4 Tolerance Test of Prediction Variables 
Independent Variable  Franchising Tolerance VIF 
Intercept 
 
Size 
 
States 
 
Foreign 
 
Growth 
 
Debt  
 
Age 
 
Risk 
 
Quick 
 
R2  
Adjusted R2
F value 
p-value 
.435 
(12.36**) 
 -.352 
(-3.09**) 
.304  
(8.57**) 
.354 
(3.748**) 
-.010 
(-.257) 
-.067 
 (-2.166*) 
-.418 
 (-13.38**) 
-.030 
 (-.982) 
.300 
(9.34**) 
.501 
.494 
68.56 
.000  
              
 
.112 
   
.726 
 
.102 
  
.587 
   
 .956 
   
.936 
 
.994 
 
.884 
 
 
 
 
 
8.92 
 
1.378 
 
9.76 
 
1.70 
 
1.05 
 
1.07 
 
1.01 
 
1.13 
T ratio appears in the parentheses 
*   Significant at 5% level 
** Significant at 1% level 
 
The goodness-of-fit measures were examined to assess the statistical significance of 
the estimated model. The observed significance level (.000) associated with χ2 for the 
model (428.23) indicated that the overall fitness of the logit model was significant. The 
goodness-of-fit measure showed that the estimated model was a significant model that 
could discriminate franchised restaurant firms from non-franchised restaurant firms with 
good accuracy. The Negelkerke R2, comparable to the R2 in multiple regressions, is 0.718 
indicating the good fit of the model. The classification accuracy rate was also examined 
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to assess how accurately the model discriminated between non-franchised restaurant 
firms and franchised restaurant firms. 
 
Table 4.5 Results of the Logit Model Estimation  
Variables Model A Odds Ratio Model B Odds Ratio 
Intercept 
 
Size 
 
States 
 
Foreign 
 
Growth 
 
Debt  
 
Age 
 
Risk 
 
Quick 
 
 
-2 Log likelihood  
Model χ2
Negelkerke R2
          .290 
(.922) 
 
 
.031 
(7.232*) 
 .968 
    (21.982**) 
 .007 
 (2.089) 
-.035 
  (3.165) 
-.134 
   (67.77**) 
-.004 
   (.271) 
1.489 
   (15.233**) 
 
339.20 
428.23** 
.718 
 
 
 
 
1.031  
 
2.632 
 
1.007 
 
.966 
 
.874 
 
.996 
 
4.433 
.549 
(3.328) 
.004 
(22.66**) 
.009 
(.397) 
 
 
.003 
(.579) 
-.048 
(6.345*) 
-.146 
(79.508**) 
-.005 
(.381) 
1.685 
(22.076**) 
 
373.285 
399.46** 
.682 
 
 
1.004 
 
1.009 
 
 
 
1.003 
 
.953 
 
.864 
 
.995 
 
5.394 
Wald test (z-ratio) appears in the parentheses 
*   Significant at 5% level 
** Significant at 1% level 
 
 The result showed that the estimated model could discriminate franchised firms 
from non-franchised firms with 91.4% accuracy. The classification results are presented 
in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6 Model A Classification Summary 
Predicted Group  
 
Actual Group 
 
Number of 
Observation  
Non-Franchised 
 
Franchised 
Percentage 
Correct 
Non-Franchised 
Franchised 
261 
294 
245 
32 
16 
262 
93.9 
89.1 
91.4 
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As with Model A, the logit regression (model B) showed that four variables (Age, 
Size, Debt, and Knowledge) of the seven variables in the model could best differentiate 
franchised restaurant firms from non-franchised restaurant firms. The χ2 for the model 
was 399.46, -2 log likelihood was 373.28, and Negelkerke R2 was 0.682 (428.23), and the 
hit ratio for this model was 90.3 (Table 4.7). Model B has a larger -2 log likelihood than 
Model A and a lower hit ratio than Model A, so model A was retained as the better model 
for discriminating franchise firms from non-franchise firms; it had better accuracy and 
was used to check predictive validity with the holdout sample. 
 
Table 4.7 Model B Classification Summary 
Predicted Group  
 
Actual Group 
 
Number of 
Observation  
Non-Franchised 
 
Franchised 
Percentage 
Correct 
Non-Franchised 
Franchised 
261 
294 
240 
33 
21 
261 
92.3 
88.7 
90.3 
  
The Wald test, the ratio of the unstandardized coefficient to its standard error, was 
used to test the significance of each of the coefficients in the logit model (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2001). Four variables (Age, State, Foreign, and Quick) were retained in the logit 
model, and all were significant at the 0.05 levels. The negative coefficient of the age 
variable showed a negative relationship between age and the firm’s decision to franchise. 
This indicated that as restaurant firms age, the probability of a decision to franchise 
decreases, further supporting H6. The sign of the coefficient of States variable was 
positive and significant at the 0.05 level. In this study, we used the number of states in 
which a firm operates to measure geographic dispersion. The positive coefficient of 
States variable indicated that the more geographically dispersed a firm, the higher the 
probability of a decision to franchise supporting H1. As with the States variable, the sign 
of the coefficient of Foreign was positive and significant at the 0.01 level. In this study, 
we used the number of foreign countries in which a firm has operations to measure the 
degree of foreign expansion. The positive sign of Foreign variable indicated that the more 
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foreign countries in which a restaurant company has operations, the more likely a firm 
will franchise supporting H3. In this study, we hypothesized that quick service restaurants 
are more likely to franchise than other types of restaurants to test the specific knowledge 
explanation of franchising.  The sign of the Quick dummy variable was positive 
supporting H8. The positive and significant dummy variable suggested that specific 
knowledge requirement had a significant effect on a restaurant firm’s decision to 
franchise. This result supported the specific knowledge explanation of franchising.  
To check the predictive validity of our model, we randomly withheld 20% of the 
observations. The estimated model (model A) could discriminate franchised firms from 
non-franchised firms with 89.7% accuracy (Table 4.8). This indicates a good degree of 
predictive validity of our model. 
 
Table 4.8 Classification Summary of Holdout Sample 
Predicted Group  
 
Actual Group 
 
Number of 
Observation  
Non-Franchised 
 
Franchised 
Percentage 
Correct 
Non-Franchised 
Franchised 
69 
97 
60 
9 
8 
88 
98.2 
90.7 
89.7 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Franchising has gained significant interest both in academia and industry. 
According to Combs, Michael, and Castrogiovanni (2004), three key franchising research 
issues should be studied to understand the franchise phenomenon: franchise initiation, 
subsequent propensity to franchise, and franchise performance. Extensive research has 
been conducted on the subsequent propensity to franchise issue (e.g., Alon, 2001; 
Brickely & Dark, 1987; Combs & Castrogiovanni, 1994; Hoover et al., 2003; Lafontaine, 
1992; Norton, 1988; Sen ,1998),  but less attention has been paid to why firms initiate 
franchising. To bridge the gap, this study used agency theory, resource scarcity theory, 
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risk sharing theory, and specific knowledge theory to investigate which theory/theories 
can best explain why firms initiate franchise.  This study used both univariate and logit 
estimations to identify major variables that discriminate between firms engaging in 
franchise contracts and those that do not. The logit analysis identified four variables 
(Age, State, Foreign, and Quick) that, in combination, can best distinguish the two 
groups.  
Both the univariate and logit regression results indicate that agency theory, 
resource scarcity theory, and specific knowledge theory can explain why firms initiate 
franchising. The significant and positive signs of States and Foreign, two agency theory 
variables, indicate that as a firm expands geographically or increases foreign expansion, 
the probability that it will franchise increases. These results support the agency theory 
argument that firms use franchising to solve agency problems and to reduce monitoring 
costs. The other significant variable in the logit model is age, a resource scarcity variable. 
The negative sign of this variable indicates that as a firm age, the probability of 
franchising decreases. This finding is consistent with practitioners (Thomas, 1991) and 
managers (Dant, 1995), who have claimed that resource scarcity influences the initial 
decision to use franchising, supporting resource scarcity theory’s argument that younger 
firms leverage franchising to overcome resource constraints.  The last significant variable 
in the logit model is the Knowledge dummy variable, a specific knowledge variable. As 
expected, the probability that a firm will franchise increases as the specific knowledge 
requirement declines. Our finding supports the specific knowledge theory argument that 
the transfer of specific knowledge between the principal and agent is a factor that affects 
the franchise decision.  However, our results do not support a risk-sharing explanation for 
franchising. Our results indicate that risk sharing does not seem to be related to the 
decision to initiate franchising. One possible explanation for the non-significant 
relationship between risk sharing and the decision to initiate franchising might be that 
risk sharing is not the major motivation to franchise. For example, in surveying 
franchisers, Dant (1995) found that the most frequently cited motives for franchising 
were market entry and growth, capital access and profits, access to managerial talent, and 
operational control and efficiency. Lillis et al. (1976) also found that in the penetration 
stage of the life cycle of a franchise, franchisee motivation was perceived as the most 
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important advantage identified by franchisers, followed by rapid market penetration, risk 
sharing, and entry capital. 
Our findings support that firms choose franchising as an organizational form 
based upon resource demand, monitoring costs, and knowledge transferability of the firm. 
Certain firms are better suited to franchising than others. In particular, franchising most 
likely will be chosen by many firms which encounter resource problems and agency 
problems. Our findings contribute to the franchising literature in many ways. First, this 
study, to our best knowledge, is the first study that used both franchise and non-franchise 
firm-level data to investigate the factors that influence the choice of organizational form, 
which contributes to understanding why firms initiate franchising. In addition, this study 
applies not just one theory, but several theories (resource scarcity, agency theory, risk 
sharing theory, and specific knowledge) to explain why firms initiate franchising, thus 
adding to our understanding of the franchising decision. Furthermore, the findings of this 
study offer restaurant firms a basis for evaluating whether franchising is an appropriate 
choice for their companies.  Potential franchisers need to focus their strategic attention on 
resources, monitoring costs, and level of specialized knowledge when making the 
decision to franchise or not to franchise. Potential restaurant franchisers also need to 
consider whether it is possible or practical to transfer the necessary operational 
knowledge to franchisees when deciding to franchise. If the operational knowledge 
needed to run the business is too much to transfer to franchisees or too costly to transfer, 
then franchising might not an appropriate method for growth of their company. 
Restaurant managers also need to understand that franchising can not reduce a firm’s risk 
and its debt leverage, for which franchising is not effective.   
Despite their theoretical and practical importance, the findings of this study are 
constrained by two major limitations which present potential subjects for further research. 
The first limitation is that we only concentrated on the restaurant industry. Concentrating 
on a single industry allows us to control for competitive and industry variations. Every 
industry, however, has a different structure, which might influence the choice of 
organizational form. Thus, this study’s findings may not be generalized to other 
industries. Future studies can use data from several industries to investigate whether and 
how industry structure affects the choice of organizational form. The other limitation is 
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that this study used secondary data extracted only from publicly-traded restaurant 
companies. These companies usually are large established restaurant companies and have 
access to capital, so the factors that affect the choice of organizational form might not the 
same as for new and small firms. Future studies can consider using a sample with both 
small and large firms to investigate additional factors that might influence the initial 
franchising decision, and to provide young or small firms with insight into the 
considerations they will face as they age, grow, or expand geographically. 
 73
References 
Alon, I. (2001). The use of franchising by U.S. –Based Retailers. Journal of Small 
Business Management, 39(2). 111-122. 
Anderson, E.E. (1984). The growth and performance of franchise systems company 
versus franchise ownership. Journal of Economics and Business, 36, 421-431. 
Bowen, D.E., & Lawler, E.E. (1992). The empowerment of service workers; what, why, 
how and when. Sloan Management Review, 33(3), 31-39.  
Bradach, L.J. (1997). Using the plural form in the management of restaurant chains. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 42, 246-303. 
Bradach, L.J. (1998). Franchise Organizations. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School 
Press. 
Brickley, J.A., & Dark, F.H. (1987). The choice of organizational from: the case of 
franchising. Journal of Financial Economics. 18, 401-420. 
Brickley, J.A., Dark, F. H., & Welsbach, M.S. (1991). An agency perspective on 
franchising. Financial Management, 20(1), 27-35. 
Carney, M., & Gedajlovic, C. (1991). Vertical integration in franchise system: agency 
theory and resources explanations. Strategic Management Journal, 12(8), 607-
629. 
Caves, R.E., & Murphy, W. F. (1976). Franchising: firms, markets, and intangible assets. 
Southern Economic Journal, 42(4), 572-586. 
Combs, J. G., & Castrogiovanni, G. J. (1994). Franchiser strategy: a proposed model and 
empirical test of franchise versus company ownership. Journal of Small business 
Management, 32(2), 37-48. 
Combs, J. G., & Ketchen, D. Jr. (1999). Can capital scarcity help agency theory explain 
franchising? Revisiting the capital scarcity hypothesis. Academy of Management 
Journal, 42(2), 196-207. 
 74
Combs, J. G., & Ketchen, D. Jr. (2003). Why do firms use franchising as an 
entrepreneurial strategy?: a meta-analysis. Journal of Management, 29(3), 443-
465. 
Combs, J.G., Michael, S.C., Castrogiovanni, G.J. (2004). Franchising: a review and 
avenues to greater theoretical diversity. Journal of Management, 30(6), 907-931. 
Dahlstorm, R., & Nygaard, A. (1994). A preliminary investigation of franchised oil 
distribution in Norway. Journal of Retailing, 70(2), 179-191. 
Dant, R.P. (1995). Motivations for franchising: rhetoric versus reality. International 
Small Business Journal, 14(1), 10-32.  
Darr, E. D., Argote, L., & Epple, D. (1995). The acquisition, transfer, and depreciation of 
knowledge in service organization: productivity in franchises. Management 
Science, 41(11), 1750-1762. 
Hair, J., Anderson, R., Tatham, R., & Black, W. (1998). Multivariate data analysis (5th 
ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Hawes, J. M. & Crittenden, W.F. (1984). A taxonomy of competitive retailing strategies. 
Strategic Management Journal, 5(3), 275-287.  
Hoover, V.L., Ketchen, D.J., & Combs, J.G. (2003, February). Why restaurant firms 
franchised: an analysis of two possible explanations. Cornell Hotel and 
Restaurant Administration Quarterly.  9-16. 
Hunt, S.D. (1973). The trend toward company-operated units in franchise chains. Journal 
of Retailing, 49(2), 3-12. 
Justis, R, & Judd, R.J. (1989), Franchising, Cincinnati, Ohio; Southwestern Publish. 
Kaufmann, P. & Dant, R. (1996). Multi-unit franchising: growth and management issues. 
Journal of Business Venturing, 11(5), 343-358. 
Lafontaine, F. (1992). Agency theory and franchising: some empirical results. Rand 
Journal of Economics, 23, 263-283. 
Lafontainc, F., & Kaufmann, P. J. (1994). The evolution of ownership patterns in 
franchise system. Journal of Retailing, 70(2), 97-113. 
Lafontaine, F., & Bhattacharyya, S. (1995). The role of risk in franchising. Journal of 
Corporate Finance, 2, 39-74. 
 75
Lillis, C.M., Narayana, C.L., & Gilman, J.L. (1976). Competitive advantage variation 
over the life cycle of a franchise. Journal of Marketing, 40 (4), 77-80. 
Martin, R.E. (1988). Franchising and risk management. American Economic Review, 78, 
954-968. 
Martin, R.E., & Justis, R.T. (1993). Franchising, liquidity constraints and entry. Applied 
Economics, 25(9), 1267-1277. 
McGuire, T.W., & Staelin, R. (1983). An industry equilibrium analysis of downstream 
vertical integration. Marketing Science, 2(2), 161-191. 
Mathewson, G.F., & Winter, R.H. (1985). The economics of franchise contracts. Journal 
of Law and Economics, 28, 503-526. 
Michael, S.C. (1996). To franchise or not to franchise: analysis of decision rights and 
organizational from shares. Journal of business venturing, 11(1), 57-71. 
Minkler, A.P. (1992). Why firms franchise: a search cost theory. Journal of Management 
Journal, 35(1), 9-37. 
Norton, S.W. (1988). An empirical look at franchising as an organizational form. Journal 
of Business, 61(2), 197-217. 
Norton, S.W. (1995). Is franchising a capital structure issue? Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 2, 75-101. 
Oxenfeldt, A.R., & Kelly, A. (1969). Will successful franchise system ultimately 
become wholly-owned chains? Journal of Retailing, 44(4), 69-83 
Oxenfeldt, A.R., & Thompson, D.N. (1968). Franchising in perspective. Journal of 
Retailing, 44(4), 3-20. 
Penrose, E.T. (1959). The Theory of the Growth of the Firm. New York: Wiley. 
Power, T. (1992). Introduction to Hospitality Industry. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2004). Economic Impact of Franchised Business. A study for 
the International Franchise Association Educational Foundation. 
Roh, Y.S. (2002). Size, growth rate and risk sharing as the determinants of propensity to 
franchise in chain restaurants. Hospitality Management, 21, 43-56. 
Rubin, P.H. (1978). The theory of the firm and the structure of the franchise contract. 
Journal of Law & Economics, 21, 223-234. 
 76
Sen, K. C. (1998). The use of franchising as a growth strategy by US restaurant 
franchisers. Journal of Consumer Marketing, 15(4), 397-407. 
Shane, S. (1998). Explaining the distribution of franchised and company-owned outlets in 
franchise systems. Journal of Management, 24(6), 717-739.  
Tabachnick, B.G. & Fidell,  L.S. (2001). Using Multivariate Statistics. Boston: Allyn & 
Bacon.  
Thomas, D.R. (1991). Dave’s way: A new approach to odd-fashioned success. New 
York: Putnam. 
Thompson, R.S. (1994). The franchise life cycle and the Penrose effect. Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization, 24, 207-218. 
Watson, A., Kirby, D.A., & Egan, J. (2002). Franchising, retailing and the development 
of e-commerce. International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management, 
30(5), 228-237. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 77
CHAPTER 5 - THE EFFECT OF FRANCHISING ON 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE  
Abstract 
Since the 1950s, franchises have significantly affected the US economy, 
generating a large proportion of its retail sales. However, despite the importance of 
franchising to the economy, little research has investigated the effect of franchising on 
financial performance in the restaurant industry. To contribute to the understanding of 
how franchising affects a firm’s financial performance, this study investigated the 
relationship between 1) the combination of franchised and company-owned outlets 
(ownership mix) and 2) financial performance of restaurant firms between 1996 and 
2005. Market-to-book ratio, Tobin’s Q, ROA, and ROE were used to measure firm value 
and profitability. This study indicates that 1) franchised firms had better financial 
performance than non-franchised firms; 2) the relationship between ownership mix and 
financial performance was curvilinear, and the inverted U shaped relationship indicated 
the existence of an optimal ownership mix that can maximize a firm’s financial 
performance; and 3) ownership mix not only had a direct effect on a firm’s intangible 
assets, but also had an indirect effect on a firm’s intangible assets through advertising. 
KEYWORDS: Optimal ownership mix, financial performance, franchising, restaurant, 
advertising. 
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Introduction 
 
Franchising is one of the fastest growing modes of retailing in the United States 
and the world (Dant et al., 2006). In a typical franchising contract, the franchisee gains 
the right to market a product or service using the brand name and operating methods of 
the franchiser. The franchisee must pay the franchiser upfront fees and royalties in 
exchange for this right. In return, the franchiser provides support to the franchisee. The 
more than 600,000 franchise business establishments in the United States generate more 
than $800 billion in annual sales; representing 41% of all retail sales and 16% of GDP 
(Justis & Judd, 1998). In 2001, franchising contributed $1.5 trillion to the US economy, 
employing more than 18 million people and more than $500 billion in payroll 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2004). Justis and Judd (2003) estimated that the number of 
franchised units will grow by 12 to 14%. A poll by the International Franchise 
Association (IFA) also indicated that franchises are expanding at approximately twice the 
rate of company-owned ventures (Bradach, 1998).  
The rapid growth of franchising has attracted the interest of researchers from a 
variety of academic fields (Elang & Fried, 1997). Most of the franchising literature has 
focused on the motivation for franchising (Anderson, 1984; Alon, 2001; Carney & 
Gedajovic, 1991; Comb & Ketchen, 1999; Hunt, 1973; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; Martin 
& Justis, 1993; Shane, 1996), plural form development (Bradach, 1997; Dant & 
Kaufmann, 2003), and the success and failure of franchising firms (Bates, 1995; 
Stanworth et al., 1998). However, financial performance has not been properly explored 
in the franchising literature (Combs et al., 2004; Watson et al., 2005). The dominant 
theories explaining the franchising phenomenon indicate that firms choosing to expand 
through franchising may have significant advantages over firms that grow through a 
corporate chain. Given the success and popularity of franchising, it may seem obvious 
that franchising may help firms achieve superior financial performance. However, 
franchising practitioners, researchers, and support groups continue to debate whether 
franchising can enhance a firm’s financial performance through superior value creation 
(Alon et al., 2004). Several studies have compared the financial performance of 
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franchised and non-franchised firms with inconclusive results. Moreover, although 
franchising can indeed improve a firm’s financial performance, to what extent a firm 
should franchise remains unknown. As many franchisers continue to operate a 
combination of company-owned and franchised outlets (Lafontaine and Kaufmann, 1994; 
Bradach, 1997), what would be the optimal level of the combination?  
The purposes of this study are, therefore, to investigate whether franchising can 
enhance firms’ financial performance and whether there is an optimal combination of 
franchised outlets and company-owned outlets (ownership mix) for maximizing financial 
performance. Moreover, with brand name capital as the most important asset owned by a 
franchiser (Norton, 1988), advertising should improve the value of an organization’s 
intangible assets (Chauvin & Hirschey, 1993; Rao et al., 2004; Simon & Sullivan, 1993). 
Thus, this study also explores whether the combination of franchised outlets and 
company-owned outlets moderates the effect of advertising expenditures on firm value. 
In the next section, we review the theoretical perspectives of the franchising 
decision to develop the research hypotheses; we then present and discuss the statistical 
results. Finally, we provide conclusions and implications based on the results. 
 
Theoretical Foundation and Research Hypotheses 
 
Resource scarcity and agency theory are frequently used to explain franchising 
decisions (e.g., Brickely & Dark, 1987; Carney & Gedajlovic, 1991; Combs & Ketchen, 
1999; Norton, 1988; Sen, 1998; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969). The theory of resource 
scarcity suggests that firms initiate franchising because of lack of capital (i.e., financial, 
human, or informational) for expansion and that franchisees were a necessary evil that 
were hard to control (Dant et al., 1996; Kaufmann & Dant, 1996; Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 
1969). Thus, as soon as financial and human capital constraints relax, the resource 
scarcity argument predicts that company-owned outlets will increase as the franchiser 
moves toward completely company-owned outlets (Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969). The 
agency theory, on the other hand, focuses on monitoring. According to agency theory, 
firms franchise because they are unable to monitor their managers efficiently. Agency 
 80
theory holds that managers tend to shirk their duties when their compensation is fixed, so 
firms incur higher monitoring costs to ensure that managers act in the company’s best 
interests. By contrast, franchisees purchase the right to profit from a particular unit by 
paying franchise fees and royalties to the franchisers. Because franchisees are owner-
managers who bear the residual of risk of a local operation, they are less likely to shirk. 
Hence, monitoring is less necessary because owner-managers of franchised units are 
compensated by residual claims from their particular units and because they put their own 
capital at risk, motivating them to maximize the present value of the franchise (Shane, 
1998). Agency theory, therefore, suggests that franchising should be a preferred 
organizational form throughout the life of a retail chain (Lafontaine & Kaufmann, 1994). 
In short, the literature suggests many potential advantages to franchising. First, 
from the aspect of resource constraints, the franchisee finances the outlet, freeing the 
franchiser from the pressure of capital expense. Second, in providing managerial 
expertise, site managers invest in the site and earn profit after franchising fees, so most 
franchise managers monitor their own business effectively. Third, in most cases, the 
franchisee knows local market conditions better, allowing a franchiser to leverage local 
market knowledge as the company expands to new areas. Fourth, economy of scale (e.g., 
purchasing and advertising) can be achieved more rapidly by a company choosing 
franchising than a company that expands through company-owned units (Aliouche & 
Schlentrich, 2005, Justis & Judd, 1998; Spinelli et al., 2003).  Fifth, by aligning 
franchiser and franchisee interests through a franchise agreement, franchising can reduce 
monitoring costs (Lafontaine & Kaufmann, 1994).  
Despite the advantages of franchising, the debate continues over whether 
franchising can actually enhance a firm’s financial performance (Alon et al., 2004). To 
date, only a handful of studies have compared the financial performance of franchised 
and non-franchised firms. Spinelli, Birley, and Leleux (2003) compared the monthly total 
returns (dividend plus capital gains) of 91 U.S. publicly held franchisers with the 
Standard and Poor’s 500 Index between 1990 and 1999. They concluded that between 
January 1991 and July 1997, the franchiser index outperformed the S&P 500. However, 
for the remaining period, the S&P outperformed the public franchiser index. Aliouche 
and Schlentrich (2005) used Economic Value Added (EVA) and Market Value Added 
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(MVA) to compare the financial performance of 24 U.S. public restaurant franchisers to 
17 non-franchisers’ performance. They concluded that between 1993 and 2002, U.S. 
public restaurant franchisers have created more value than their non-franchiser 
competitors, and franchisers created a slightly higher market value and economic value 
than non-franchisers. Alon, Drtina, and Gilbert (2004) used the DuPont model and found 
the mean ROE was 7.29% for non-franchised firms and 6.61% for franchised firms, but 
the difference was not statistically significant.  
In summary, how much franchising affects financial performance is still up for 
debate. Previous studies have not reached consistent conclusions, so further investigation 
is needed to assess the effect of franchising on financial performance, providing 
empirical evidence to future researchers and to industry. Based on the literature, we 
hypothesized: 
 
H1: Franchised restaurant firms have better financial performance than non-
franchised restaurant firms. 
Ownership mix and performance 
According to the agency theory, managers will tend to shirk their duties because 
their compensation is fixed, meaning that higher monitoring costs are incurred to ensure 
that managers act in the firm’s best interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Franchising can 
solve this problem (Shane, 1998). Therefore, agency theory suggests that franchising 
firms should perform better than those that retain ownership and hire managers 
(Lafontaine, 1992; Shane, 1998; Sorenson & Sorensen, 2001). In addition, the risk 
sharing theory suggests that incorporating franchisee capital in the business can reduce 
franchisers’ capital requirements and risks.  As the Executive Vice-president of 
Fishermen’s Landing remarked, “…with franchise units, you receive a smaller margin 
but the return on investment approaches infinity because there is no investment” 
(Bradach, 1998, p. 68). Again, firms with more franchising should perform better than 
non-franchised firms and franchising firms with less franchising.  
Despite these advantages, franchising also creates certain disadvantages compared 
to company owned units. For example, franchisees might pursue personal benefits by 
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reducing quality within their units to save costs and increase profits, with losses incurred 
by providing lower quality products or services are borne by other franchisees and 
ultimately causes damage to the brand name. Other disadvantages include less control 
over business processes, products, and profit in franchised units than in company owned 
units (Heide, 1994).  
Many researchers have argued that franchising and company-owned systems are 
not opposing but rather complementary organizational forms (Cliquet & Croizean, 2002; 
Sorenson & Sorensen, 2001). Using the organizational learning theory, Sorenson and 
Sorensen (2001) also contended that companies can gain the benefits of innovation and 
knowledge transfer by having both company-owned units and franchised units. In a 
survey, Lafontaine and Kaufmann (1994) found that franchisors intend to continue to 
operate a combination of company-owned and franchised outlets. Practitioners also state 
that a mixture of company-owned and franchised units made the chain stronger than an 
exclusive reliance on one or the other (Bradach, 1997). Having franchised units can 
provide a source of market knowledge and innovative ideas that can be incorporated into 
the company-owned units (Lafontaine & Kaufmann, 1994), and company-owned outlets 
allow companies to test policies and programs and gain knowledge of operational details 
(Dant & Kaufmann, 2003). The experience gained from company-owned outlets also 
could be used to negotiate more control of the franchisees (Dant et al., 1992). Therefore, 
retaining a combination of company owned and franchisee owned outlets creates a 
synergy. A full company-owned system and a full franchised system might not be able to 
produce the best financial performance for a firm. Thus, a firm’s financial performance 
may improve as the proportion of its franchised outlets increase, but after a certain point, 
the financial performance might begin to degrade with an increasing proportion of 
franchised outlets. Therefore, we hypothesized that there might be an optimal ownership 
mix level for best performance and that the relationship is curvilinear. 
H2: There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the proportion of franchised 
outlets and financial performance. 
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Ownership mix, advertising, and firm value 
In general, advertising expenditures affect the value of an organization’s 
intangible assets (Chauvin & Hirschey, 1993; Rao et al., 2004; Simon & Sullivan, 1993). 
Advertising can create market based assets that may lower the costs of sales, create price 
premiums through brand equity, and generate competitive barriers, and therefore increase 
a firm’s cash flow and intangible value (Srivastava et al., 1998). Brand name capital is 
the most important asset owned by a franchiser (Norton, 1988). In the restaurant industry, 
where asset intangibility is high, having a strong corporate logo, standardized facilities, 
among other things, helps reduce intangibility in the consumer’s mind (Cross & Walker, 
1987). Many franchisers use franchising as way to penetrate markets and build brand 
name capital rapidly (Anderson, 1984). When a firm has a large proportion of franchised 
outlets, its advertising may be more effective because it can cover a large market and 
increase brand equity (Srinivasan, 2006). Therefore, the higher the firm’s advertising 
expenditures and the higher the proportion of its franchised outlets, the higher its 
intangible value should be.  
Nonetheless, the effect of advertising in franchising may be contingent on the 
proportion of ownership, due to the free ride phenomenon. Specifically, franchising could 
create the problem of free riding when a franchisee does not deliver the guaranteed 
quality imposed by the franchise agreement. Although the franchisee can reduce 
operation costs and increase profits with inferior products and services, this can 
negatively affect the firm’s product perception, its brand name, and its performance. 
Mathewson and Winter (1985) observed that the incentive for a franchisee to free ride 
increases as the franchiser’s brand name strength rises. By examining evidence from both 
the restaurant and the hotel industries, Micheal (2000) also found that quality is 
negatively related to franchising in the chain, suggesting that franchising increases free-
riding and decreases quality in a decentralized service chain. Thus, when a firm with 
more advertising also has more franchised outlets, increased free riding may reduce its 
intangible assets. Given these two opposite effects, this study hypothesized the following: 
 
H3: The proportion of franchise units moderates the relationship between advertising 
and financial performance. 
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Methodology 
Sample selection and sources of data 
The sample for this study consisted of publicly held restaurant companies. One 
hundred publicly traded restaurant companies on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 
the America Stock Exchange (AMEX), and the National Association of Securities 
Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) were first drawn from the Standard and 
Poor’s COMPUSTAT database with Standard Industry Classification (SIC) code of 5812. 
Of 100 restaurant companies, 18 firms were eliminated from the analysis because number 
of stores data for the ten-year study period (1996 – 2005) was not available. Thus, a total 
of 82 restaurant companies were available for the sample. To screen the database and to 
determine the final sample for subsequent data analysis, first, observations missing any 
components of the variables used in this study were deleted from the database. Second, 
any observed variables with extremely high or low values, not within three standard 
deviations of the mean, were eliminated from the database as outliers. In addition, some 
firms reported positive ROE that were mathematical anomalies, resulting from both 
negative net income and owners’ equities, and negative financial leverage, resulting from 
negative owner’s equities, were deleted from the data set. Thus, 592 observations for the 
restaurant firms were retained for analysis.   
Dependent variables 
Several methods are available to measure financial performance, and each 
valuation method has its own strengths and weaknesses. One method of determining 
financial performance is to measure the market-to-book ratio and Tobin’s Q (Day and 
Fahey, 1988). The market-to-book ratio and Tobin’s Q approximate the stock market’s 
perception of the value of the firm’s present and future income and growth potential 
(Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988). The higher the market-to-book ratio and Tobin’s Q, 
the higher the value of the intangible assets of the firm. Another method that can be used 
as an indicator of financial performance is accounting returns. Return on assets (ROA) 
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and return on equity (ROE) are the usual measures of financial performance (Dickerson 
et al., 1997). ROA was computed by dividing net income by average total assets. ROE 
was computed by dividing net income by average stockholder equity. 
Following extant performance studies (Alon et al., 2004; Bharadwaj et al., 1999; 
Rao et al., 2004), we used ROA, ROE, market-to-book ratio, and Tobin’s Q ratio to 
measure financial performance. The market-to-book ratio was calculated by dividing 
price per share by book value per share. A firm creates value when the market-to-book 
ratio is more than 1.0, destroys value when market-to-book value is less than 1.0, and 
sustains value if the market-to-book ratio is 1.0 (Varaiya et al., 1987). Tobin’s Q ratio 
plays an important role in many financial interactions (Chung & Puritt, 1994).  It was 
developed by economist James Tobin as a predictor of a firm’s future investments 
(Tobin, 1969). This ratio has successfully explained a variety of corporate phenomena. 
For example, it has been used as a measure of returns from diversification (Lang and 
Stulz, 1994; Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988), as a measure of brand equity (Simon & 
Sullivan, 1993), and as an indicator of a firm’s intangible value (Hirschey, 1982).  
Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the year-end total market value of the firm to 
the estimated replacement costs of assets. Due to the difficulty of acquiring all the 
information necessary to calculate it, an approximation of Q, introduced by Chung and 
Pruitt (1994), was used in this study to measure firm performance. Approximate Q is 
defined as the market value of common equity plus the liquidating value of preferred 
stock plus the book value of total debts minus the book value of short-term assets, and 
divided by the book value of total assets.   
Independent Variables 
The key independent variable in this study is the proportion of franchised outlets, 
defined as the ratio of franchised outlets to total number of outlets. A firm is fully 
company-owned when the proportion of franchised outlets value is 0, fully franchised 
when the proportion of franchised outlets value is 1, and have both franchise- and 
company-owned units if the proportion of franchised owned outlets value lies between 1 
and 0. 
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To estimate the relationship between franchising and financial performance, 
several variables, identified in previous studies as having a significant relationship with 
firm value, were controlled for possibly causing a spurious correlation between 
franchising and financial performance. The following is the summary of extensive 
literature review for those variables. 
The size of a firm affects its performance in many ways. Key features of a large 
firm are its diverse capabilities, the ability to exploit economies of scale, and scope. 
These characteristics make operations more effective, allowing large firms to perform 
better than small firms (Ben-Zio & Shalit, 1975). Chauvin and Hirschey (1993) also 
argued that economy of scale enables large firms to enjoy advantages in cost of sales, 
labor, and advertising and promotion. Consequently, large firms produce more profit, 
increasing their market value. Therefore, we included firm size, measured as log of total 
assets (SIZE), to account for firm size as it affects profitability and firm value.  
According to Miller and Modigliani (1961), leverage should not affect firm value. 
However, firms with more leverage can enjoy tax shelters because they can deduct 
interest costs, resulting in better cash flow and higher performance indicators (McConnell 
& Servaes, 1990; Habib & Ljungqvist, 2005). On the other hand, increasing leverage also 
results in additional costs. As leverage increases, bankruptcy costs rise. Therefore, 
financial leverage and financial performance may have either a positive or a negative 
relationship. We had no a priori expectation for the sign of the leverage coefficient in this 
study. Financial leverage was measured as the total debt to total assets. 
Advertising, measured as advertising expenditures to total assets, was included in 
market-to-book and Tobin’s Q models to account for the possibility that advertising may 
affect a firm’s intangible assets. Previous studies found that advertising is effective in 
creating awareness, enhancing consumer knowledge, influencing consumer preferences, 
and has a positive and long-term influence on a firm’s market value (Abdel-Khalik, 1975; 
Chauvin & Hirschey, 1993; Jones, 1995; Josh & Hanessens, 2004; Hirschey, 1982; 
Simon & Sullivan, 1993; Rao et al., 2004). Thus, a positive relationship between 
advertising and Tobin’s Q and a positive relationship between advertising and market-to-
book value are expected.  
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Profitability, represented by ROA, was also included in market-to-book and 
Tobin’s Q models to capture the potential effects of profitability on firm value. 
According to Hirschey (1982), current profit rate is an important and highly significant 
determinant of the market value of a firm. In general, a higher operating margin triggers 
expectations among investors of higher cash flow potential and drives intangible value. 
Many studies have found that firm profitability positively affects Tobin’s Q (Bharadwaj 
et al., 1999; Rao et al., 2004). Therefore, a positive effect of ROA on market-to-book 
ratio and Tobin’s Q are expected. 
Table 5.1 provides brief summary of the variables selected in this study to assess 
firm financial performance. These variables were used in the multivariate regression 
analysis. 
 
Table 5.1 Measurement of Financial Variables 
Variable Description 
ROA Net income/Average total assets 
ROE Net income/Average stockholders’ equity 
Market-to-book ratio (M/B) Price per share/Book value per share 
Tobin’s Q (Q) (MVE + PS + DEBT) / TA 
Financial Leverage (DEBT) Total debt / Total equity 
Advertising Ratio (AD) Advertising expenditure/Total assets 
Firm Size (SIZE) Total assets 
Proportion of franchise outlets Franchised outlets/Total outlets 
 
 
Statistical Analysis  
To test hypothesis H1 (Franchised restaurant firms have better financial 
performance), paired samples t-tests checked the mean differences of franchise and non-
franchise firms’ ROA, ROE, market-to-book ratio, and Tobin’s Q ratio. To test 
hypothesis H2 (There is curvilinear relationship between the proportion of franchised 
outlets and financial performance), the following multiple multivariate regression 
models were used:  
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Market-to-book ratio = β0 + β1 Size + β2 ROA+ β3 Financial leverage + β4 Advertising + β5 
Proportion of franchise units + β6 (Proportion of franchise units)2   + ε        (1) 
 
Tobin’s Q = β0 + β1 Size + β2 ROA + β3 Financial leverage + β4 Advertising + β5 Proportion 
of franchise units + β6 (Proportion of franchise units)2  + ε                            (2)  
 
ROA = β0 + β1 Size + β2 Proportion of franchise units + β3 (Proportion of franchise units)2 
+ ε                       (3)  
 
ROE = β0 + β1 Size + β2 Proportion of franchise units + β3 (Proportion of franchise units)2  
+ ε                            (4) 
  
Equation 1 allowed us to examine the relationship between proportion of franchised 
units and market-to-book ratio, while controlling for other firm specific variables 
(profitability, financial leverage, and firm size). The squared term of proportion of 
franchise units was included to capture the potential nonlinear relationship between 
ownership mix and financial performance. Equation 2 estimated the relationship between 
proportion of franchised units and Tobin’s Q, while controlling for other firm specific 
variables (profitability, financial leverage, and firm size).   
Equation 3 examined the relationship between proportion of franchise units and 
ROA, while controlling for firm size and financial leverage. Equation 4 examined the 
relationship between proportion of franchise units and ROE, while controlling for firm size 
and financial leverage. 
To test hypothesis H3 (Proportion of franchise units moderates the relationship 
between advertising and financial performance), an interaction term of advertising and 
proportion of franchise outlets was added to equations 1 and 2 to capture the potential 
moderating effect of proportion of franchise units on advertising and financial 
performance: 
Market-to-book ratio = β0 + β1 Size + β2 ROA+ β3 Financial leverage + β4 Advertising + 
Proportion of franchise units + β6 (Proportion of franchise units)2   + β7 
(Advertising x Proportion of franchise units) + ε         (5) 
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 Tobin’s Q =   β0 + β1 Size + β2 ROA + β3 Financial leverage + β4 Advertising + β5 
Proportion of franchise units + β6 (Proportion of franchise units)2  + β7 (Advertising x 
Proportion of franchise units) +  ε               (6)  
 
Table 5.2 Pearson’s Bivariate Correlations 
 SIZE ROA DEBT AD Franchise % 
SIZE 1     
          ROA .149** 1    
DEBT       -.005       -.020 1   
          AD       -.065 -.182** .025 1  
         Franchise %        .047  .165**  .001 -.002 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed). 
  
Before statistical analyses were run, several steps ensured the validity of the 
econometric specification and related assumptions underlying the statistical models. First, 
we checked the normality of all the variables used in the models. As Barnes (1987) 
stated, company financial variables are seldom distributed normally, and the variables 
used in this study were no exception. To obtain normality, total assets, financial leverage, 
advertising, market-to-book, and Tobin’s Q were natural log transformed, and the log-
transformed variables were used in the multivariate regression analysis. Second, we 
checked for multicollinearity in our models. Multicollinearity reduces the predictive 
power of independent variables because the effects of the independent variables are 
mixed or confounded (Hair et al., 1998). As shown in Table 5.2, ROA was negatively 
correlated (p<0.05) with advertising expenditure and positively correlated (p<0.05) with 
proportion of franchised outlets, and firm size was positively correlated (p<0.05) with 
ROA. The significant correlations between these independent variables could cause 
problems in multiple regression analysis. However, the VIFs (variance inflation factors) 
of our models were all less than 2, which indicated little likelihood of any 
multicollinearity effect on the parameter estimates (Hair et al., 1998). Third, 
heteroskedasticity could occur in cross-sectional models (Studenmund, 2006), so we 
conducted the White test (White, 1980) to detect any heteroskedasticity in our 
regressions. Heteroscedasticity does not cause OLS (ordinary least squares) coefficient 
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estimates to be biased. The variance of the coefficients, however, tends to be 
underestimated, inflating t-scores and sometimes making insignificant variables appear 
statistically significant (Studenmund, 2006). The results indicated that our models had 
significant heteroskedasticity properties of parameter estimates. Therefore, instead of 
OLS regressions, the heterosedasticity-consistent standard errors (HCSE) suggested by 
White (1980) were applied to all the models to improve OLS estimates. Generally, 
HCSEs are higher than their OLS counterparts, resulting in lower t-scores and a reduced 
probability of statistically significant coefficients (White, 1980). 
 
Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics of Franchised and Non-Franchised Financial 
Variables 
 Q M/B ROA ROE SIZE 
(million) 
DEBT 
Mean All 
Franchising 
Non-Franchising 
1.35 
1.43 
1.26 
2.29 
2.60 
1.94 
3.73 
4.97 
    2.21 
   7.72 
10.44 
4.34 
756 
1136 
291 
3.30 
2.73 
3.99 
Minimum All 
Franchising 
Non-Franchising 
0.26 
0.26 
0.35 
.12 
.16 
.12 
-14.32 
-14.19 
-14.32 
-48.94 
-48.94 
-41.14 
1.62 
6.58 
1.62 
.06 
.12 
.06 
Maximum All 
Franchising 
Non-Franchising 
3.92 
3.56 
3.92 
13.43 
13.43 
10.78 
27.85 
27.85 
16.39 
51.87 
51.87 
51.03 
29989 
29989 
3010 
244 
241 
244 
Std. 
Deviation 
All 
Franchising 
Non-Franchising 
0.70 
0.70 
0.70 
 
1.71 
1.44 
1.86 
6.38 
6.31 
6.14 
13.16 
11.80 
13.97 
2794 
3696 
501 
16.97 
15.55 
18.58 
 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.3 presents the descriptive summary of the variables used in this study. 
The mean Q of the 88 sampled firms in our sample was 1.35 from 1996 to 2005. The 
mean Q value for franchised firms was higher than non-franchised firms. The mean 
market to book ratio (M/B) was 2.29. Consistent with Tobin’s Q, the mean M/B for 
franchised firms was higher than for non-franchised firms. As with the results for Tobin’s 
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Q, the mean ROA and ROE for franchised firms were higher than for non-franchised 
firms. In addition, the mean total assets of franchised firms was about US $1136 million, 
with non-franchised firms at about US $291 million. The mean debt to equity ratio of 
sample firms was 3.30. The mean debt ratio for non-franchised firms was higher than 
franchised firms, indicating non-franchised firms use more debt to finance their operation 
than franchised firms. 
 
Table 5.4 Results of Financial Performance Difference between Franchised and 
Non-franchised Companies 
 
Variables Franchised Non-franchised Mean difference T-ratio 
ROA 4.97 2.21 2.76 5.861** 
ROE 10.44 4.34 6.10 5.700** 
Tobin’s Q 1.43 1.26 0.17 2.853** 
M/B 2.60 1.94 0.66 4.887** 
** Significant at 1% level 
Statistical Test Results 
The Effect of Franchising on Financial Performance 
Paired samples t-tests showed that the financial performances of franchised firms 
and non-franchised firms differed. Table 5.4 displays the results. For Tobin’s Q, M/B, 
ROA, and ROE, the p-values were all less than 0.001, clearly indicating that the 
differences were significant. Franchised firms had higher Tobin’s Q, M/B, ROA, and 
ROE than non-franchised firms, supporting Hypothesis 1.  
Ownership Mix and Financial Performance 
Table 5.5 shows the results of ownership mix on financial performance. As 
presented in Table 5.5, except for M/B, the proportion of franchise outlets and the 
squared term of proportion of franchise outlets significantly affected Tobin’s Q, ROA, 
and ROE. In the M/B model, the coefficient of proportion of franchise outlets was 
positive, and the coefficient of squared term of proportion of franchise outlets was 
negative; however, neither coefficient was statistically significant at p < 0.05 level, 
Therefore, proportion of franchise outlets has no impact on the market-to-book value of 
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Table 5.5 Effects of Ownership Mix on Financial Performance of Restaurant Firms 
Independent Variable M/B Tobin’s  Q ROA ROE 
Intercept 
 
ROA 
 
DEBT 
 
SIZE 
 
AD  
 
Proportion of 
franchised outlets 
Sq. Proportion of 
franchised outlets 
 
 
 
R2  
Adjusted R2
F value 
p-value 
N 
          -.210 
(1.94) 
 .040 
    (11.01**) 
 .116 
 (2.85*) 
.075 
  (4.56**) 
.053 
   (2.12*) 
.578 
   (1.812) 
-.533 
   (-1.431) 
 
 
.309 
.301 
      38.764 
.000 
528 
 
          -.186 
(-2.04) 
 .024 
    (7.08**) 
 -.036 
 (-1.20) 
.073 
  (5.44**) 
.037 
   (1.96*) 
.496 
   (2.08*) 
-.680 
   (-2.04*) 
 
 
.285 
.276 
      32.259 
.000 
492         
-3.724 
(-4.545**) 
 
 
-2.618 
(-8.347**) 
1.153 
(7.561**) 
 
 
16.810 
(5.929**) 
-18.818 
(-5.736**) 
 
 
.284 
.278 
46.923 
.000 
567 
 
-6.823 
(-4.836**) 
 
 
-1.592 
(-3.168*) 
2.300 
(8.851**) 
 
 
30.099 
(5.926**) 
-32.023 
(-5.339**) 
 
 
.211 
.205 
37.594 
.000 
567 
*   Significant at 5% level 
** Significant at 1% level 
 
restaurant firms. Hypothesis 2 is partially supported by these results. The positive sign of 
proportion of franchise outlets and the negative sign of squared term of proportion of 
franchise outlets indicate that an inverted U shaped relationship exists between financial 
performance and ownership mix, indicating an optimal ownership mix at which the 
financial performance is maximized. These coefficient estimates (in Table 5.5) imply that 
the proportion of franchised outlets relates positively to Tobin’s Q up to about 72%, but 
after that the relationship is negative. Like the Tobin’s Q model, the proportion of 
franchised outlets is also positively related to ROA and ROE up to about 89% and 94%, 
respectively, and then the relationship becomes negative. Furthermore, these coefficient 
estimates also imply that, everything else being equal, chains that franchised 
approximately 37% of their total units have the highest Q value and chains that 
franchised approximately 48% of their total units have the highest ROA and ROE.  
Overall, our results support Bradach’s (1998) claim that company owned and 
franchised units complement each other. On the one hand, franchising allows the use of 
franchisees’ managerial and financial resources to reduce capital requirements, operating 
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costs, monitoring costs, and risk (Alon, 2001; Anderson, 1984; Brickely et al., 1991; 
Carney & Gedajovic, 1991; Shane, 1998; Srinivasan, 2006). On the other hand, 
franchisees may use free riding as franchising outlets increase, which can negatively 
affect a firm’s product perception, its brand name, and its performance. The significant 
positive coefficient of proportion of franchise outlets and negative coefficient of the 
squared term of proportion of franchised outlets suggests that a firm’s Tobin’s Q, ROA, 
and ROE improve as proportion of its franchise outlets increase. However, the costs 
associated with managing franchisees are likely to outweigh gradually the benefits 
associated with the resources that franchisees provide and negatively affect financial 
performance.   
 
Moderating Effect of Ownership Mix on the Financial Performance of Advertising  
Because the proportion of franchise outlets variable does not have significant 
main effect on market-to-book value, we did not test Equation 5. To test Hypothesis 3, 
we added an interaction term of advertising and proportion of franchise outlets in Tobin’s 
Q model (Equation 6) to test whether the proportion of franchise outlets moderates the 
effect of advertising on Tobin’s Q.  As presented in Table 5.6, the interaction term of 
advertising and proportion of franchise outlets do have a significant positive effect on 
Tobin’s Q. The significant interaction term of advertising and proportion of franchise 
outlets indicates that ownership mix moderates the effect of advertising on Tobin’s Q, 
which suggests that advertising is more effective if a firm has a high proportion of 
franchise outlets.  The coefficient of the interaction term shows that for every 1% of 
increase/decrease of proportion of franchise outlets, the coefficient of advertising 
increases/decreases by 0.182. Moreover, as shown in the Q model (Table 6), the 
significant positive proportion of franchise outlets and interaction term of advertising and 
proportion of franchise outlets indicate that proportion of franchise outlets not only direct 
affects a firm’s Tobin’s Q but also contributes to the effectiveness of advertising to 
increase brand equity and firm value.  
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Table 5.6 Effects of Ownership Mix on Advertising Expenditure and Firm Value 
Independent Variable Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q VIF 
Intercept 
 
ROA 
 
DEBT 
 
SIZE 
 
AD  
 
Proportion of franchised 
outlets 
 
Sq. Proportion of franchised 
outlets 
 
AD x Proportion of 
franchised outlets 
 
 
R2  
Adjusted R2
F value 
p-value 
∆ R2 
N 
    -.186 
(-2.04) 
 .024 
    (7.08**) 
 -.036 
 (-1.20) 
.073 
  (5.44**) 
.037 
   (1.96*) 
.496 
   (2.08*) 
 
-.680 
   (-2.04*) 
 
 
 
 
 
.285 
.276 
              32.259 
.000 
 
 
 
492         
                 - .305 
(-2.96) 
.023 
  (6.76**) 
-.042 
 (-1.39) 
.074 
  (5.56**) 
 .003 
  (.011) 
1.097 
(3.45**) 
 
-.654 
(-2.33*) 
 
.182 
(2.61**) 
 
 
                  .292 
.282 
              27.840 
.000 
.007 
 
492 
 
 
1.27 
 
1.15 
 
1.17 
 
1.05 
 
1.01 
*   Significant at 5% level 
** Significant at 1% level 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The extent theories that explain franchising have hypothesized that franchising 
allows franchise firms to use franchisees’ managerial and financial resources to reduce 
capital requirements, monitoring costs, and risk. Thus, franchising should improve firm 
performance. Few studies have examined the relationship between franchising and firm 
performance. The conclusions of these studies, however, are inconclusive. Moreover, to 
date, to our best knowledge, no study has investigated the optimal level of combining 
company owned and franchised outlets to maximize firm performance. This study 
examined the impact of franchising on restaurant firm performance and thus, contributes 
to the body of knowledge on the restaurant industry. 
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Overall, our results show that firms choosing to expand through franchising may 
have significant advantages over firms that grow by opening company owned outlets. In 
particular, this study has found that franchise companies show stronger financial 
performance than non-franchise companies, as measured by market-to-book, Tobin’s Q, 
ROA, and ROE, in the restaurant industry from 1996 to 2003. The results are robust to 
alternative measures of financial performance. More importantly, this study found that 
the relationship between proportion of franchise outlets and financial performance is 
curvilinear, an inverted U shaped relationship. This finding implies an optimal ownership 
mix that should maximize financial performance. This finding supports the argument that 
franchising and company-owned systems are not opposing but rather complementary 
organizational forms (Cliquet & Croizean, 2002; Sorenson & Sorensen, 2001). Having 
both company owned units and franchised units can create synergies, maximizing firm 
value. The inverted U shaped relationship indicates that as franchise outlets increase, the 
advantages of franchising will improve firm value and profitability but that too many 
franchises will hurt performance because the disadvantages of franchising will eventually 
outweigh its advantages.  Apparently, there is a limit to improving financial performance 
through franchising.   
 This study also examined the moderating effect of ownership mix on advertising 
and firm value. The finding is that a mix in ownership not only directly affects a firm’s 
intangible assets, but also indirectly affects a firm’s intangible assets through advertising. 
This result confirms Srinivasan’s (2006) argument that a firm with more advertising and 
a large proportion of franchised outlets finds its advertising more effective because it can 
cover a larger market and increase its level of brand equity (Srinivasan, 2006). 
In conclusion, to our best knowledge, this study is the first study to investigate the 
relationship between ownership mix and financial performance, representing an 
important step towards empirically probing the fundamental question of how franchising 
affects financial performance. The findings of this study not only contribute to the 
literature on the franchising phenomena but also benefits executives, managers, 
franchisees, and investors in several ways. First, owners and managers of restaurant firms 
can use the findings to maximize their firm’s values and profitability by adjusting the 
number of company owned and franchised outlets. Investors can use the information 
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provided by this study to assess a restaurant chain’s value. Potential franchisees also can 
use the information to help them evaluate potential performance of franchisers before 
joining the franchise system.  
Despite the theoretical and practical significance of the findings, this study is not 
free from limitations. The first limitation is that we only focus on restaurant industry. 
This focus allowed us to control for competitive and industry variations. However, other 
industries might have different competitive environments that influence financial 
performance. Thus, our findings may not generalize to other industries. Research on the 
relationship between franchising and firm performance should be extended to other 
industries to see if franchising can also serve as a performance enhancer.  
Second, this study was restricted to a limited number of chain restaurants whose 
financial data was publicly accessible from Standard and Poor’s Compustat. These 
companies usually are large, established restaurant companies with access to capital 
market; thus, the impact of franchising on financial performance might differ from small 
franchisers. Future studies can consider using a sample containing both small and large 
firms to investigate further the U-shape relationship between the combination of 
company owned and franchised outlets and financial performance. In addition, future 
study should also investigate whether other organizational operating characteristics (e.g., 
how many states or foreign countries the organization has operations) moderate the 
relationship between ownership mix and financial performance.  
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Chains represent one of the dominant organizational forms of last few decades, 
and franchising is a very important part of these chain operations (Bradach, 1997). Since 
the early 1950s, the growth of chain organizations has outpaced the growth of the 
economy, reflecting the marketing power of these organizations and the value consumers 
place in them (Luxenberg, 1985).  
Despite the importance of franchising to the economy, few theoretical or 
empirical studies have investigated why firms initiate franchising (Combs et al., 2004). In 
addition, little research has examined the relationship between franchising and financial 
performance (Alon et al., 2004; Combs et al., 2004; Watson et al., 2005). The purposes of 
this study were to apply several existing theoretical frameworks to the factors that affect 
the choice of organizational forms and to investigate the financial performance of 
franchising operations. Specifically, this study examined how well agency theory, 
resource scarcity theory, risk sharing theory, and specific knowledge theory can justify 
the franchising decision individually. Furthermore, this study used market-to-book ratio, 
Tobin’s Q, ROA, and ROE as performance measures to investigate whether franchising 
affects restaurant firms’ market value and profitability and to investigate the relationship 
between the proportion of franchised outlets (ownership mix) and financial performance.   
Major Findings 
In Study #1, eight hypotheses were proposed. T-tests and logistic regression 
models tested those hypotheses with the following results. The letter “S” indicates the 
hypothesis was supported and “NS” indicates the hypothesis was not supported. 
H1: Franchised firms in the restaurant industry are more geographically 
dispersed than non-franchised firms. (S) 
H2: Franchised firms are larger in terms of number of outlets than non-
franchised firms. (S) 
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H3: Franchised firms are more likely to be involved in foreign expansion than 
non-franchised firms. (S) 
H4: Franchised firms have a higher growth rate than non-franchised firms. (S) 
H5: Franchised firms have a lower debt to equity ratio than non-franchised 
firms. (NS) 
H6: Franchised firms are younger when they started franchising than non-
franchised firms. (S) 
H7: Franchised firms are less risky than non-franchised firms. (NS) 
H8: Quick service restaurants are more likely to be franchised than other types 
of restaurants. (S) 
The independent samples t-tests showed that at p value < 0.001 significance level, 
franchised and non-franchised groups were different in six variables – State, Size, 
Foreign, Growth, Age, and Knowledge.  The results showed the franchised group was 
more geographically dispersed than the non-franchised group, supporting H1. The results 
also showed that franchised firms were larger than non-franchised firms and had 
operations in more foreign countries than non-franchised firms, supporting H2 and H3.  
The results also suggested that franchised firms expanded faster than non-franchised 
firms and that franchised firms started franchising very early to overcome capital and 
managerial resource constraints, supporting H4 and H6.   The differences of total debt to 
equity ratio and variation of operating cash flows between franchised and non-franchised 
groups were not statistically significant. Therefore, H5 and H7 were not supported. A 
dummy variable was used to test H8. The mean value of the Knowledge variable for the 
franchised firms was significantly higher than that of non-franchised firms. Moreover, 
more than 47% of franchised firms were quick service restaurant chains, but only 17% of 
non-franchised firms were quick service restaurants. Accordingly, H8 was supported.  
Note the logistic regression results also indicated that the combination of four 
variables, age, geographic dispersion, foreign expansion, and specific knowledge, can 
best distinguish franchised firms from non-franchised firms, which further supported H2, 
H3, H6, and H8. 
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In Study #2, Hypotheses 9, 10, and 11 were proposed. Independent samples t-tests 
and multivariate regression analysis tested these hypotheses. 
H9: Franchised firms have better financial performance than non-franchised 
firms. (S) 
H10: There is a nonlinear relationship between the proportion of franchised 
outlets and financial performance. (S) 
H11: Proportion of franchise units moderates the relationship between 
advertising and financial performance. (S) 
Paired samples t-tests results indicated that franchised firms had significant higher 
market-to-book ratio (M/B), Tobin’s Q, ROA, and ROE than non-franchised firms. H9 was 
supported. Multivariate regression results showed that both the proportion of franchised 
outlets and the squared term of proportion of franchised outlets had significant effects on 
Tobin’s Q, ROA, and ROE. However, proportion of franchised outlets did not have a 
significant impact on the market-to-book value. Therefore, H10 was partly supported. 
Additionally, results showed that the interaction term of advertising and proportion of 
franchised outlets had significant positive effects on Tobin’s Q. The significant interaction 
term implied that ownership mix moderates the effect of advertising on Tobin’s Q. H11 
was supported by this result. 
 
Conclusions and Implications 
The primary objectives of this study were to investigate factors that affect 
franchise decision and the effects of franchising on financial performance. This study 
found that agency theory, resource scarcity theory, and specific knowledge theory can 
explain why firms initiate franchising and that the combination of geographical 
dispersion, foreign expansion, age, and specific knowledge variables could discriminate 
franchised firms from non-franchised firms with 91.4% accuracy. The significant and 
positive signs of geographic dispersion and foreign expansion, two agency theory 
variables, indicated that as a firm expands geographically or increases foreign expansion, 
the probability that it will franchise increases. The negative sign of age variable indicated 
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that as firm ages, the probability of franchising decreases. The significant and negative 
sign of specific knowledge dummy variable indicated that the probability that a firm will 
franchise increases as specific knowledge requirement declines. However, our results did 
not support a risk sharing explanation for franchising. One possible explanation for the 
non-significant relationship between risk sharing and the decision to initiate franchising 
might be that risk sharing is not the major motivation to franchise. For example, in 
surveying franchisers, Dant (1994) found that the top four most frequently cited motives 
for franchising were market entry and growth, capital access and profits, access to 
managerial talent, and operational control and efficiency.  
 Overall, our findings suggest that potential franchisers need to focus their 
strategic attention on resources, monitoring costs, and level of specialized knowledge in 
making a decision to franchise. Potential restaurant franchisers also need to consider 
whether it is possible or practical to transfer the necessary operational knowledge to 
franchisees when deciding to franchise. If the operational knowledge needed to run the 
business is too much to transfer to franchisees or too costly to transfer, then franchising 
might not an appropriate method to achieve growth. Restaurant managers also need to 
understand that franchising does not appear to reduce a firm’s risk and its debt leverage.   
This study also found that franchised companies had better financial performance 
than non-franchised companies, as measured by market-to-book, Tobin’s Q, ROA, and 
ROE. More importantly, this study found that the relationship between proportion of 
franchised outlets and financial performance is curvilinear, an inverted U shaped 
relationship. This finding implies that there is an optimal ownership mix that maximizes 
financial performance. This important finding lends support to the argument that 
franchising and company-owned systems are not opposing, but rather complementary 
organizational forms (Cliquet & Croizean, 2002; Sorenson & Sorensen, 2001; Bradach, 
1998). The inverted U shaped relationship indicated that as franchised outlets increase, 
the advantages of franchising, such as capital availability, risk sharing, and market 
penetration, will improve a firm’s value and profitability. However, excessive levels of 
franchisee ownership are likely to hurt corporate performance because the disadvantages 
of franchising, such as free riding, loss of control, and loss of profit, will eventually 
outweigh its advantages. Therefore, firms need to balance the marginal costs and benefits 
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of using company owned and franchised outlets to maximize performance.  Furthermore, 
this study found that ownership mix not only directly affects a firm’s intangible assets, 
but also indirectly affects a firm’s intangible assets through advertising. As suggested by 
Srinivasan (2006), for a firm with a large proportion of franchised outlets, advertising is 
more effective because of the larger market and the resulting increased level of brand 
equity (Srinivasan, 2006). Our findings offer valuable implications for restaurant 
managers. Namely, company owned and franchised units clearly have their own 
individual strengths and weaknesses. If an organization can use both company owned and 
franchised units to leverage the strengths of the other, then the overall financial 
performance will be better than if either structure operates alone. 
In conclusion, this study identified the following situations as most suitable for 
franchising: (1) a firm is in the early stage of business and needs additional resources to 
grow; (2) a firm begins to expand geographically; (3) a firm is ready for foreign 
expansion; and (4) a firm’s operations are relative simple and repetitive. More 
importantly, this study’s findings suggest that no single theory available fully explains 
why firms initiate franchising. Furthermore, this study found that a purely company-
owned or a purely franchised chain does not produce the best financial performance. If an 
organization can use both company owned and franchised units to leverage the strengths 
of the other, then overall financial performance will be enhanced.  
 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research 
Despite the theoretical and practical importance of this study, a few limitations 
were noted, which may suggest some potential subjects for further research. First, this 
study only used data from the restaurant industry to explain the initial decision to 
franchise and to investigate how franchising affects financial performance. However, 
every industry has a different structure and different competitive environments, which 
might influence the choice of organizational forms as well as financial performance. 
Thus, this study’s findings may not generalize to other industries. Future research should 
examine other industries to see if and how industry structures affect the choice of 
organizational forms and whether franchising can also serve as a performance enhancer 
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in other industries. Second, the sample of firms examined here are all publicly traded 
restaurant companies. These companies are usually large, well-established companies 
with many outlets; thus, the factors that affect the choice of organizational forms and the 
impact of franchising on financial performance might be different for small franchisers. 
Future studies should be done to see whether the same factors hold true for small 
franchisers on the initial franchising decision and to see whether the inverted U-shape 
relationship between the proportion of franchised outlets and financial performance is 
consistent across industries.  Third, the study did not test whether other organizational 
characteristics, such as geographic dispersion, system size, and the degree of foreign 
expansion, affect the optimal mix of company owned and franchised outlet. Future study 
should incorporate these factors into models to further investigate the optimal ownership 
mix. 
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